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ARE HEDGE FUNDS STILL PRIVATE?
EXPLORING PUBLICNESS IN THE
FACE OF INCOHERENCY
Cary Martin Shelby*

ABSTRACT
Academics have frequently noted that the term “public” is one of the
most undertheorized concepts under our federal securities laws. It has
never been sufficiently defined by Congress, and issuers must instead rely
on various indicators of publicness gleaned from an extensive patchwork
of rules and exemptions. A prevalent indicator of publicness includes the
status of investors, where investment companies that broadly offer investments to the general public, such as mutual funds and money-market
funds, are required to register under a complex web of federal legislation.
Relatedly, private investment companies such as hedge funds and private
equity funds, which restrict offerings to elite investors, are typically considered private and are thus exempt from federal regulation. Other historical
indicators include advertising, size of pool, and number of investors/clients. However, these historical indicators of publicness did not capture the
increasing effect that private funds were having on the general public, such
as systemic risk, retailization, and participation in the shadow banking industry. Congress responded by expanding indicators of publicness through
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(Dodd-Frank Act), which created new registration requirements for private
funds irrespective of the status of such underlying investors.
Nevertheless, this article argues that Congress has improperly focused on
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modity Exchange Act of 1936, to integrate evolving notions of publicness
in the regulation of investment companies. Congress should instead focus
on the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act), which is the primary
legislation tailored to the industry. In focusing on these ancillary laws,
Congress has complicated the patchwork of regulation that applies to these
entities. This improper focus has also resulted in under-inclusive and overinclusive indicators of publicness under the 1940 Act, further compromising investor protection in these burgeoning markets. An alternative framework should: (1) integrate emerging indicators of publicness under the
1940 Act; (2) conduct a wholesale review of the 1940 Act; and (3) monitor
other strategies that could invoke public concerns such as hedge fund activism, third-party litigation funding, and investment in distressed economies
such as Detroit, Puerto Rico, and Greece. This article builds on the current
literature which has largely focused on the incoherency of publicness in the
context of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. This article is the first to assess whether emerging notions of publicness have been properly incorporated under the 1940 Act.
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I. INTRODUCTION

R

EGISTERED investment companies (RICs),1 such as mutual
funds and money-market funds, are a dominating force in the
American and global economy. Such entities collectively manage
over $18.2 trillion for over 90 million individuals in the United States.2
Households often depend on these vehicles as a predominant saving
mechanism to support education, retirement, and several other categories
of expenses. For instance, mutual funds managed 55% of the total assets
within 401(k) plans toward the end of 2014, making RICs a vital component of retirement accounts across the nation.3 As background, RICs are
typically managed by an entity adviser that solicits and pools investor
capital into a single fund.4 The adviser then invests the fund’s assets into a
variety of equity, debt, or cash instruments, with the hopes of earning a
return to pass along to its underlying investors.5 Investors often prefer
RICs because they provide immediate access to a diverse portfolio of investments, as well as to the expertise of the adviser.6 While the term
“public” has not been specifically defined under the federal securities
laws,7 RICs are subject to a complex web of federal legislation because
they are available for investment by the general public (also known as
“retail investors”).8 In particular, RICs must register under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act), which is the primary legislation
governing the industry.9 It includes detailed disclosure mandates, restrictions on risky investments, governance requirements, and several other
directives that extend beyond the “truth in securities”10 framework mandated by the inaugural Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and Securi1. For purposes of this article, RICs encompass all investment companies that are
required to register under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq.
(2012) [hereinafter 1940 Act].
2. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A
REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 6
(55th ed. 2015), http://www.icifactbook.org/fb_ch1.html [https://perma.cc/E9C3-85K8].
3. Id. at 161.
4. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES § 1.01
(2015) [hereinafter LEMKE, INVESTMENT COMPANIES] (providing an overview of investment company structure).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (discussing legislative origins of the term “public”).
8. See discussion infra Part II (summarizing various federal mandates that apply to
investment company structures).
9. 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (2012).
10. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://
www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml [https://perma.cc/CVM4-5QUE].
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ties Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).11
In contrast, private investment companies (Private Funds), which include hedge funds and private equity funds, are generally exempt from
the complex web of regulation applicable to RICs.12 Private Funds evade
regulation by restricting investors to institutional investors and high networth individuals.13 Such investors are deemed to have the resources adequate to protect themselves without the need for federal safeguards.14 In
spite of this exclusivity, Private Fund industries have grown exponentially
in recent decades since institutional investors such as pension plans, insurance companies, and endowments are increasingly relying on these vehicles to manage risk and earn returns.15 As of April 2015, hedge funds
managed a total of $3.125 trillion in the United States,16 while private
equity funds managed $1.5 trillion.17 In spite of reports that hedge funds
are not consistently beating the markets in recent years,18 the industry is
likely to continue to grow, particularly since these vehicles have access to
innovative strategies and instruments that are not available to their registered counterparts.19 One study predicted that hedge funds will manage a
11. See discussion infra Part II.A (providing detailed explanation of specific restrictions and mandates provided under the 1940 Act).
12. For purposes of this article, Private Funds include all investment companies that
are exempt from regulation under the 1940 Act.
13. These elite investors are legally defined as “accredited investors” and “qualified
purchasers” under the Securities Act and 1940 Act, respectively. See infra notes 141–142,
151–162 and accompanying text for specific definitions.
14. See infra notes 141–142, 151–162 and accompanying text.
15. QUINNIPIAC UNIV. ALT. INV. INSTITUTE & CONN. HEDGE FUND ASS’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY FALL 2014 10, http://www.quinnipiac.edu/prebuilt/pdf/institutes/alternative_investments/2014_Institutional_Investor_Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/
47TG-UZZS] (concluding that institutional investors will increase allocations to private
funds in coming years); see also discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing how increasing life
expectancy and ballooning deficits are forcing pension plans to seek creative mechanisms
for earning returns). But see James B. Stewart, Hedge Funds lose Calpers, and More, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), at B1 (reporting that Calpers, the California Public Employees’
Retirement System, terminated its $4.5 billion hedge fund allocation to “reduce complexity
and costs”) (internal quotations omitted).
16. Hedge Fund AUM at $3.13 trillion as Allocations Continue into April, EVESTMENT
(Apr. 2015), https://www.evestment.com/resources/research-reports/2015-research-reports/
global-hedge-fund-asset-flows-report—april-2015 [https://perma.cc/N36Y-SWX8].
17. Arleen Jacobius, Big private equity managers ruling the roost, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.pionline.com/article/20150406/PRINT/304069998/big-pri
vate-equity-managers-ruling-the-roost [https://perma.cc/C8VP-A3TR].
18. SIMON LACK, THE HEDGE FUND MIRAGE: THE ILLUSION OF BIG MONEY AND
WHY IT’S TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE 1 (2012) (arguing that on average, hedge funds have not
been able to exceed the risk-free rate of return provided by government issued treasury
bills). But see Thomas Schneeweis & Hossein B. Kazemi, An Academic Response to the
‘Hedge Fund Mirage’ 1 (Sept. 30, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228851 [https://perma.cc/
P4HA-Y939] (providing a direct critique of the methodologies employed by the author of
Hedge Fund Mirage: “The author of ‘Hedge Fund Mirage’ does not have the net profits to
hedge funds but such data is required before true comparisons between net profit to investor and net profit to hedge fund manager can be made[ ] . . .”).
19. See generally Cary Martin Shelby, Privileged Access to Financial Innovation, 47
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 315, 346–60 (2015) [hereinafter Shelby, Privileged Access Article] (providing in-depth analysis of strategies and instruments that RICs cannot access due to stringent restrictions under the 1940 Act).
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total of $5.8 trillion in 2018.20 Pension plans are primary drivers of this
growth, even though the underlying beneficiaries of such plans are comprised of retail investors. In 2014 for example, the Pennsylvania Public
School Employees’ Retirement System allocated 10.5% of its plan assets
into hedge funds, the Public School and Education Employee Retirement
Systems of Missouri 13.7%, and the Texas County & District Retirement
System 25%.21
The exponential growth of these industries is occurring in the midst of
a rapidly evolving regulatory landscape for investment company structures, the effects of which have not been sufficiently investigated. More
specifically, Congress drastically altered historical “indicators of publicness”22 under the recently passed Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).23 Although academics have frequently noted that the term public is one of the most
under-theorized concepts under our federal securities laws,24 common indicators of publicness have arisen through an extensive patchwork of
rules and exemptions. As briefly discussed above, a prevalent indicator of
publicness includes the status of investors. Investment companies that restrict offerings to elite investors are considered private and are thus exempt from federal regulation.25 An additional indicator includes
advertising, where investment companies that broadly solicit investments
from the general public, such as mutual funds and money-market funds,
are required to register under a complex web of federal legislation.26 Additional indicators include size of the pool and number of investors/
clients.27
However, these original indicators of publicness did not appropriately
20. Halah Touryalai, Everybody Loves Hedge Funds, Assets Hit Record $3 Trillion,
FORBES.COM (June 25, 2014, 1:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2014/06/
25/everybody-loves-hedge-funds-assets-hit-record-3-trillion/ [https://perma.cc/F7GC6HJU].
21. Christine Williamson, Big public pension funds’ hedge fund portfolios outperform
their indexes, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.pionline.com/article/
20141222/PRINT/312229982/big-public-pension-funds-hedge-fund-portfolios-outperformtheir-indexes [https://perma.cc/J22X-RGFT].
22. For purposes of this article, “indicators of publicness” refer to the characteristics
that have been legally identified under federal securities laws as significant factors in assessing the publicness of an issuer, an investment adviser, or a securities offering.
23. See discussion infra Part III.B (summarizing new regulatory framework for Private
Funds under the Dodd-Frank Act).
24. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation after the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339 (2013) (“[T]he
public-private divide has long been an entirely under theorized aspect of securities
regulation.”).
25. See discussion infra Part II.C (explaining how the “status of investors” became a
prominent indicator of publicness under federal securities laws).
26. See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (examining the evolution of “advertising” as an
indicator of publicness under the Securities Act, and the recently passed JOBS Act).
27. See discussion infra Part II (providing basic descriptions of the various exemptions
and exclusions that incorporate “size of pool” and “number of investors/clients” as prominent indicators of publicness).
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account for evolving “notions of publicness”28 such as systemic risk, participation in the shadow banking industry, and the retailization of Private
Funds.29 With respect to systemic risk, Private Funds were increasingly
creating systemic risk through their power to incur unlimited leverage
and trade in exotic derivatives.30 Information related to a Private Fund’s
interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity, and global activities
could possibly provide meaningful information regarding systemic risk,
but these categories of activities were not historically monitored under
federal securities laws.31 Comparable activities were historically created
by banking institutions and monitored by accompanying bank regulators,
making it difficult for Congress to seamlessly integrate Private Funds into
the federal securities laws rubric.32 Other concerns expressed by congressional and SEC reports include the participation of Private Funds in the
shadow banking industry, as Private Funds are increasingly engaged in
the creation and distribution of credit without being subject to regulatory
oversight.33 Retailization, which generally encompasses the indirect exposure of Private Funds to retail investors through pension plans and other
institutional investors, was also expressed as a major concern by regulators.34 As pension plans continued to invest in these private industries,
regulators queried whether underlying retail investors were sufficiently
protected.35
Congress eventually responded to these evolving notions of publicness
by creating new registration requirements for Private Funds under the
Dodd-Frank Act.36 Under this legislation, certain Private Funds must register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act).37 Overthe-counter (OTC) derivatives, which are frequently traded by Private
Funds, must now be traded through clearinghouses registered under the
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (Commodity Exchange Act).38 The
Dodd-Frank Act also provides the SEC with the power to collect and
28. As used in this article, “notions of publicness” generally refers to financial innovations that have impacted the ways in which regulators should treat publicness under the
federal securities laws.
29. See discussion infra Part III.A (explaining how these emerging notions of publicness impacted Congress’s decision to regulate Private Funds under the Dodd-Frank Act).
30. See discussion infra Part III.A.
31. See discussion infra Part V.A (summarizing proposed definitions of these terms,
provided by the FRB and IOSCO in a joint consultation study completed on March 4,
2015).
32. See, e.g., Mission, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm [https://perma.cc/RBC6-G2JU]
(The Federal Reserve’s mission includes the following: “supervising and regulating banking
institutions to ensure the safety and soundness of the nation’s banking and financial system
and to protect the credit rights of consumers [and] maintaining the stability of the financial
system and containing systemic risk that may arise in financial markets . . . .”).
33. See supra note 29.
34. See supra note 29.
35. See supra note 29.
36. See discussion infra Part III.B (summarizing the new regulatory framework for
Private Funds under the Dodd-Frank Act).
37. See discussion infra Part III.1.
38. See discussion infra Part III.2.
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analyze confidential and proprietary information from certain Private
Funds and disclose such data to the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), which is a new entity designated to monitor systemically relevant entities.39 Nevertheless, this article argues that Congress has improperly focused on ancillary laws, such as the Advisers Act and Commodity
Exchange Act, to integrate evolving notions of publicness in the regulation of investment companies, as opposed to the 1940 Act, which is the
primary legislation tailored to the industry. Since these evolving notions
of publicness have been integrated into ancillary laws, or addressed
through additional layers of regulation, Congress has effectively expanded and complicated the patchwork of regulation that applies to these
entities. Defining the contours of publicness for investment company
structures is now an arduous task that involves mapping out a long list of
ancillary exemptions and trying to predict the extent to which FSOC may
deem a Private Fund systemically harmful. Thus, there is no clear concept
of publicness from a theoretical, regulatory, or practical perspective.
This article builds on the current literature on this topic, which has
largely focused on the incoherency of publicness in the context of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.40 For instance, Professors Donald
Langevoort and Robert Thompson have examined evolving notions of
publicness with respect to the offering of securities in their oft-cited article “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation after the JOBS
Act.41 They similarly evaluated Congress’s response to these innovations
under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act) in
light of the inconsistent treatment of publicness under federal securities
laws.42 The Securities Act, for example, focuses on the status of investors
in determining publicness while the Exchange Act focuses on the size of
the entity as well as number of shareholders of record.43 In comparison,
this article is the first to assess whether emerging notions of publicness
have been properly incorporated under the 1940 Act. In assessing the
resulting harm, this article is also distinct in its focus on investor protection. Congress’s improper focus on ancillary legislation has resulted in
39. See discussion infra Part III.3.
40. See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 24 (analyzing evolving assessment
of publicness under the JOBS Act of 2012); see also Robert B. Thompson & Donald C.
Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (2013); A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited:
Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 999, 1001 (2013) (“[T]he resulting mismatch between the public-private dividing lines
under [the Securities and Exchange Acts] means that the transition from private to public
will inevitably be awkward, abrupt, and fraught with problems for issuers, investors, and
regulators.”); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Principles for Publicness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 649, 653
(2015) (“This Article proposes reframing the regulation of public companies under U.S.
federal securities law around three well-worn regulatory principles: (1) suitability, (2) efficiency, and (3) representativeness”); Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137 (2011) (“[T]he failure of the fiduciaries of public corporations to understand their ‘publicness’ . . . accounts for many of the recent scandals.”).
41. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 24, at 340.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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under-inclusive and over-inclusive indicators of publicness under the 1940
Act, which could further compromise investor protection in these burgeoning markets.
With respect to the reliance on under-inclusive indicators, such as status
of investors, for example, it is possible that a systemically harmful Private
Fund could evade regulation under the 1940 Act, while the SEC and
FSOC is engaged in the opaque process of aggregating and analyzing proprietary data from this same fund. Consider, for example, the Texas
County & District Retirement System, which has allocated 25% of its
assets into hedge funds.44 The underlying beneficiaries of this pension
plan include retail investors among the 255,000 county and district employees in Texas.45 If this pension inadvertently invests with a hedge fund
that is later deemed systemically harmful, the pensions of these underlying retail investors could be adversely affected. Given the growing reports
that hedge funds cannot sufficiently beat the markets, which could induce
advisers to pursue even riskier strategies, refining the regulation of these
industries is of the utmost importance.46 Mandating tailored registration
under the 1940 Act could preemptively deter investor exposure to systemically harmful entities by subjecting such funds to standardized valuations, mandatory disclosure, and various other protections. However, as
will be further discussed below, a wholesale review of the 1940 Act would
be a necessary endeavor as many of the rigorous provisions of this law
could unduly compromise capital formation.
Over-inclusive indicators do not permit regulators to make nuanced
distinctions amongst the heterogeneous nature of the fund industry. Individual retail investors are restricted from directly accessing the more innovative strategies of Private Funds, some of which may not pose a
systemic threat to the economy. RICs are automatically subject to the
stringent capital restrictions under the 1940 Act and are therefore limited
in accessing innovative products such as derivatives, illiquid instruments,
distressed securities, and other exotic instruments.47 The potential harms
of these innovations have been well-documented by researchers across
disciplines.48 Given these harms, this article does not advocate unfettered
44. Williamson, supra note 21.
45. Who We Serve, TEX. CTY. & DIST. RET. SYS., https://www.tcdrs.org/AboutUs/
Pages/WhoWeServe.aspx [https://perma.cc/JHJ9-57HY].
46. LACK, supra note 18.
47. See generally LEMKE, INVESTMENT COMPANIES, supra note 4, § 8 (providing detailed description of regulatory framework underlying mutual fund capital restrictions,
which includes applicable 1940 Act provisions, as well as corresponding rules and cases).
48. See generally BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15, http://
www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4ZK-TZZK] (Warren
Buffet’s firm famously stated that “derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction,
carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives
and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (generally
arguing that the deregulation of OTC derivatives under the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 was a major contributor to the Great Recession); Larry Swedroe, It’s
time to regulate financial instruments, CBS MONEYWATCH (Apr. 12, 2012, 8:21 AM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/its-time-to-regulate-financial-instruments/ [https://perma.cc/CC85-
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access to these instruments by retail investors. However, the current public-private divide, which gives elite investors unfettered access while retail
investors have no direct access, is not sufficiently nuanced to accommodate the growing intricacies of the markets. This inequitable access is
more likely to have an adverse impact on retail investors during times of
economic distress, when hedge funds can rely on their increased freedoms
to engage in short-trading and other innovative strategies to protect investors from these declining prices.49 As retail investors are the most vulnerable class of investors during times of economic distress, the
disparities created by this divide have become more problematic.50
An alternative framework should first integrate evolving indicators of
publicness under the 1940 Act. For example, to the extent regulators can
agree on appropriate systemic risk indicators, such as interconnectedness,
substitutability, complexity, or global activities, such indicators could be
integrated into existing 1940 Act exemptions. To the extent that additional funds are required to register under the 1940 Act as a result of
these new indicators, a wholesale review of the law is a necessary endeavor, as many of the provisions may unduly restrict capital formation.
For example, the existing restrictions on leverage and derivatives would
likely need to be retooled, as well as the complete bar against conflict of
interest transactions. These archaic restrictions may have played a role in
Congress’s decision to avoid the 1940 Act in the new regulation of Private
Funds. Relatedly, many of these archaic restrictions may unduly restrict
retail investors from directly accessing innovative strategies. Long-term
steps include consistently monitoring other strategies that could invoke
public concerns such as hedge fund activism, third-party litigation funding, and investment in distressed economies such as Detroit, Puerto Rico,
and Greece. These emerging strategies fall outside the purview of systemic risk, but they could similarly have a latent impact on the general
public. For example, investment in distressed economies could create scenarios where Private Funds have a direct impact over the public policies
produced by these governments.51
In summary, Part II provides a description of the patchwork regulation
that applies to investment companies. It begins with a brief roadmap of
the 1940 Act, which is the primary legislation that regulates investment
company structures, and proceeds with an overview of the ancillary laws
such as the Securities Act, Exchange Act, Advisers Act, and Commodity
Exchange Act. It concludes by explaining how the assessment of publicness is the primary driver of the accompanying exemptions of these laws.
BWE2] (querying whether innovative products should be freely accessible to the general
public given harms revealed during Great Recession).
49. Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 244 (2009) (generally arguing that
hedge fund flexibilities allow such advisers to consistently outperform the broader
markets).
50. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
51. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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Part III highlights the ways in which Private Funds started to invoke public concerns through the creation of systemic risk, their participation in
the shadow banking industry, and the retailization of the industry. Congress responded through the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, which
amended ancillary laws as a means of incorporating these emerging notions of publicness. Part IV explores the resulting harms of this ancillary
law focus, some of which include over-inclusive and under-inclusive indicators of publicness under the 1940 Act. Part V proposes an alternative
framework that includes the following tasks: (1) integrate emerging indicators of publicness under the 1940 Act; (2) conduct a wholesale review
of 1940 Act; and (3) monitor other possible indicators of publicness. Part
VI concludes.
II. PATCHWORK REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANY
INDUSTRY
Investment companies are subject to an intricate patchwork of regulation under the following pieces of federal legislation: the 1940 Act, the
Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the Advisers Act, and the Commodity
Exchange Act. This Part begins with a broad overview of the 1940 Act,
which is the primary legislation that is directly tailored to the unique investor protection issues that accompany investment company structures.
The 1940 Act includes detailed disclosure mandates, capital restrictions,
anti-fraud provisions, governance requirements, and several other directives that extend beyond the inaugural legislation provided under the Securities and Exchange Acts. This Part proceeds by briefly summarizing
the ancillary laws that apply to these entities.
Part II.C then examines the origins of common indicators of publicness, which largely derive from the private-offering exemption under the
Securities Act as well as accompanying SEC and Supreme Court interpretations. The remaining federal securities laws similarly incorporate indicators of publicness within numerous exemptions and exclusions. In
determining these investment company exemptions, regulators attempt to
define “publicness” as they do not seek to regulate activities that would
not have an adverse impact on the public in terms of investor protection,
capital formation, and market integrity. This Part concludes by outlining
these common exemptions that Private Funds frequently rely on, which
include common indicators of publicness such as status of investors, number of investors/clients, size of pool, and advertising.
A. PRIMARY LEGISLATION: 1940 ACT
Investment company vehicles share many of the same structural characteristics that have compelled the need for tailored regulation under the
1940 Act. Investment companies52 are usually organized as corporations
52. 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (defining investment companies as “any issuer
which . . . is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily,
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that are overseen by a board of directors.53 Investment advisers are often
considered the “brain” of such entities as they create the fund and manage its assets.54 The adviser’s unique investment strategy comprises a variety of financial instruments, predominantly stocks, bonds, and cash
instruments.55 The adviser then solicits investments from a number of individuals and institutions, and invests the resulting pool of capital pursuant to the predetermined strategy.56 Many investors prefer investment
companies over investing directly in the markets because advisers provide
expertise and immediate access to diversification across a range of financial instruments.57 In exchange for providing this service to investors, advisers receive a fee calculated as a percentage of the total assets of the
underlying pool.58
Several investor protection concerns naturally arise from the unique
relationship between advisers and investors. First, there is an inherent
conflict of interest between these parties since advisers seek to earn the
highest possible fees from managing investment companies. Investors on
the other hand seek to pay the lowest possible fees as those fees get subtracted from any capital gains earned by the pool. Excessive fees could
essentially gouge into any gains allocated to investors, thereby significantly compromising the protection of investor capital.59 Second, advisers
may not voluntarily disclose material information regarding the content
of the pool or the pool’s distinct structural features. Advisers may have
incentive to perpetuate these information asymmetries for a number of
reasons, which can include a desire to keep the pool’s strategy proprietary from competing advisers and regulators, or an effort to conceal the
adviser’s fraudulent activities. Inadequate disclosures make it difficult for
investors to optimize their decisions on how best to allocate their limited
capital.60 Third, since investment companies attract a significant portion
of the national savings from the general public, the trading activities of
in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; . . . or . . . is engaged or
proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in
securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding
40 per centum of the value of such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities
and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis”).
53. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A
HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 252 (1992) [hereinafter PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/icreg5092.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZU7-T9A6].
54. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MUTUAL FUNDS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 6 (2010)
[hereinafter MUTUAL FUND GUIDE], http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mu
tual-funds.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E33-L2YR]; see also discussion infra Part II.B (summarizing the separate regulatory framework that applies to such advisers under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940).
55. MUTUAL FUND GUIDE, supra note 54, at 7.
56. Id. at 6–7.
57. Mutual Funds Can Help Lower Investing Risks, VANGUARD.COM, https://investor.
vanguard.com/mutual-funds [https://perma.cc/4MYN-L8DT].
58. MUTUAL FUND GUIDE, supra note 54, at 14.
59. PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY, supra note 53, at 255–56.
60. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 24 (3d ed. 2010).
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such vehicles could have a vital effect on capital formation in the broader
economy.61
In addition to the unique conflicts of interest between advisers and investors, many fraudulent abuses were uncovered in the 1920s and 1930s,
when the investment company industry “suffered from a number of conspicuous abuses, including self-dealing, inordinately complex capital
structures, self-perpetuating managements, and excessive fees.”62 Congress sanctioned a study in 1936, where the SEC investigated and confirmed the pervasive occurrence of these abuses (1936 Study).63 A
member of the SEC’s staff aptly summarized the findings of this 1936
Study as follows:
The [1936 Study], and the subsequent Congressional hearings, found
that, to an alarming extent, investment companies were being organized and operated to benefit the interests of their affiliates rather
than the interests of their shareholders. The highly liquid nature of
fund assets made them easy targets for embezzlement by affiliates,
who often viewed them as a source of private capital. Transactions
between investment companies and their affiliates, which were expressly permitted to allow investment companies to participate in the
business dealings of affiliated financial firms, often resulted in improper transactions. Underwriters found it convenient to dump into
the portfolios of affiliated funds securities that they found to be
unmarketable.64
Between 1929 and 1936, the SEC estimated that “investment company
shareholders lost 40 percent of their investments.”65
In response to the abuses discovered in the 1936 Study, Congress
passed the 1940 Act, which is frequently viewed by commentators as being the most complex legislation under our rubric of federal securities
laws.66 In addition to mandating supplemental disclosure obligations for
investment companies, beyond the disclosures mandated under the inaugural Securities Act and Exchange Act,67 this law also limits the total
amount of leverage that such funds may utilize.68 The law implements
61. 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a)–(b) (declaring that underlying activities of investment company structures have a direct impact on the national public interest).
62. Richard M. Phillips & Robert G. Bagnall, The Investment Company Act of 1940: A
Time For Reassessment, in 22nd ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 593, 596
(Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 713,
1990).
63. Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the
American Law Institute/American Bar Association Investment Company Regulation and
Compliance Conference (June 14, 2001) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch500.htm) [https://perma.cc/32EF-MJ4W].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (“[T]he great securities law scholar, Louis Loss, described the ‘40 Act as the
most complex of the federal securities laws.”).
67. LEMKE, INVESTMENT COMPANIES, supra note 4 § 5.02 (summarizing the extensive
disclosure requirements that apply to registered investment companies).
68. 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (providing specific restrictions on the capital structure implemented by registered funds).
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direct limits on loans from banks69 and provides that registered funds
must be appropriately “covered”70 before engaging in derivative transactions. Congress designed these capital restrictions to protect investor capital from excessive risk-taking. As a result, investment companies that
must register under the 1940 Act are significantly restricted in the kinds
of strategies that they can offer to investors.71
Specific governance requirements are likewise an integral component
of this law. Certain conflict of interest transactions between the fund and
its fiduciaries are completely prohibited,72 and a percentage of board directors must be deemed independent.73 The board is largely viewed as
being the “watchdog” of the adviser, to ensure that the adviser is not
exploiting its position for personal gain.74 In addition, advisers must calculate the fund’s performance data, as well as its valuations, in a standardized format so that investors can easily compare a large range of
funds.75 The law further mandates that investment company advisers
treat shareholders equally and fairly, and it relatedly prohibits advisers
from creating inordinately complex structures.76 The process through
which advisers can advertise and promote funds is also tightly regulated
under the 1940 Act.77
B. ANCILLARY LEGISLATION
Although the 1940 Act directly targets the potential market failures
within the investment company industry, such vehicles are subject to additional layers of regulation under the federal laws discussed below.
Scholars suggest that this patchwork of regulation results from a variety
of factors: administrative inefficiencies,78 historical accident,79 and the bifurcated regulation of the financial industry,80 to name a few. Most notably, the SEC has primary jurisdiction over securities and other related
69. Id. § 80a-18(f)(1) (specifying that registered funds must have 300% asset coverage
for any indebtedness incurred from third-party banks).
70. LEMKE, INVESTMENT COMPANIES, supra note 4 § 8.06(2)(b)(ii); see also Shelby,
Privileged Access Article, supra note 19, at 346–50 (outlining various mechanisms for appropriately “covering” derivative transactions).
71. Shelby, Privileged Access Article, supra note 19, at 346.
72. 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a).
73. Id. § 80a-10(a).
74. PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY, supra note 53, at 253.
75. LEMKE, INVESTMENT COMPANIES, supra note 4, § 9.
76. Id. § 2.04(2).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Exemption: The Changing Definition of
an Accredited Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 683 (suggesting that the SEC regulated private investment companies through an extensive patchwork of exemptions instead of undergoing a much-needed wholesale review of the 1940 Act).
79. Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An
Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 338 (1999) (“[L]argely as a result of historical
accident, our financial system is built upon a heterogeneous collection of regulatory structures, each with a surprising degree of political resilience within its own traditional sphere
of authority.”).
80. Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN.
L. REV. 537, 538 (2009).
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instruments, while the CFTC has regulatory jurisdiction over futures and
other derivative instruments.81 Since investment companies often trade in
both instruments, they must either register or seek exemptions under
laws overseen by each of these administrative agencies. This section consequently provides a brief summary of the ancillary laws that apply to
investment companies, namely the Advisers Act, the Securities Act, the
Exchange Act, and the Commodity Exchange Act.
1. Advisers Act
While the 1940 Act directly regulates investment company entities, federal law includes additional regulatory obligations for the underlying advisers of such pools.82 These advisers can serve in their individual
capacities or through formally organized business associations. The Advisers Act defines “investment advisers” as “any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities . . . .”83 Investment advisers serve a variety of clients in this
capacity, including individual investors, mutual funds, pension plans, corporations, endowments, and trusts.84 Advisers that must register under
the Advisers Act are commonly referred to as “Registered Investment
Advisers” (RIAs). The RIA industry has also expanded in recent years as
the industry has collectively tripled its assets in the past decade.85 In 2015,
a total of 11,473 RIAs served approximately 29.7 million clients and collectively managed $66.7 trillion in regulatory assets under management.86
Commentators have frequently noted that the Advisers Act is the least
restrictive among the federal securities laws and of “considerably less
consequence [than the 1940 Act], originally providing little more than a
pro forma registration requirement for personal investment advisers with
fifteen or more clients, and antifraud provisions.”87 Nevertheless, advisers regularly manage numerous unrelated client accounts and funds, and
such clients will likely find information related to general management
activities material. Characteristics of the particular adviser, such as past
81. See generally id. (discussing the roles of both the SEC and CFTC, and the Treasury
Department’s Blueprint for combining them into a single regulatory body).
82. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2012) [hereinafter Advisers
Act].
83. Id. § 80b-2(a)(11).
84. INV. ADVISER ASS’N & NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., 2015 EVOLUTION REVOLUTION: A PROFILE OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISER PROFESSION 2, https://www.investmentad
viser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/EVREV/evolution_revolution_2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S42M-SFCD].
85. Christopher Condon, The Rise of the Registered Investment Adviser, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, (March 3, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/con
tent/11_11/b4219041484091.htm [https://perma.cc/29SZ-YHXF].
86. INV. ADVISER ASS’N & NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., supra note 84, at 7.
87. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 222 (3d ed. 2003); see
also Barry P. Barbash & Jai Massari, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Regulation by
Accretion, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2008) (“[W]hen compared to its companion statute, the
Investment Company Act of 1940, the Advisers Act places relatively few substantive burdens on entities that fall within its registration requirements.”) (internal citations omitted).
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criminal history (if any), prior or existing lawsuits, and the professional
and educational background of individual portfolio managers, are also
relevant to investors.88 Given the necessity of trust between investors and
advisers, investors benefit greatly from heightened fiduciary duties that
apply to advisers who manage their assets.89
RIAs are automatically subject to the various registration and fiduciary
requirements under the Advisers Act, unless there is an available exclusion or exemption.90 More specifically, RIAs have a general fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of their clients in dispensing
accompanying investment advice.91 In exchange, clients pay RIAs a fixed
fee, which is typically one to two percent of the client assets the RIA
manages.92 This fixed fee is distinguishable from the commission stockbrokers receive, which amounts to a percentage of each particular sale.93
Stockbrokers are also subject to lower fiduciary standards where they are
only obligated to offer products that are suitable for prospective clients.94
Some commentators have attributed the growth of the RIA industry to
these heightened fiduciary obligations, coupled with the freedom to advise without being hampered by the pressures of commissions.95 RIA clients are further protected by the disclosure requirements provided under
the Advisers Act. RIAs must disclose material information relating to
their business practices, fees, disciplinary history, certain conflicts of interest, and other material information related to their advisory business.96
RIAs must also create and maintain compliance programs to prevent violations of the Advisers Act, and the SEC has the power to inspect RIAs
randomly to ensure compliance with these various provisions.97
2. Securities and Exchange Acts
The Securities and Exchange Acts comprise the inaugural legislation
passed by Congress in response to the massive stock market frauds and
related losses that occurred during the Great Depression.98 These laws
were among the first to regulate public offerings, and the Securities Act—
widely known as the “truth in securities” law—boasts the underlying
principle of providing investors with material information about the ini88. Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1)(A)–(H) (RIAs must disclose comparable
information under this provision.).
89. See SEC Fiduciary Standard, INV. ADVISER ASS’N, https://www.investmentadviser.
org/eweb/dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=KI_Fiduciarydty [https://perma.cc/E8QG-A4LN].
90. Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3.
91. INV. ADVISER ASS’N, supra note 89.
92. Condon, supra note 85.
93. Stockbroker, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stockbroker.asp
[https://perma.cc/HQR2-L3BQ] (defining stockbrokers as “[a]n agent that charges a fee or
commission for executing buy and sell orders submitted by an investor”).
94. Condon, supra note 85.
95. Id.
96. Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1)(A)–(H).
97. Id. § 80b-3(k)(1).
98. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/AS27-QX2J].
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tial issuance of securities.99 With the disclosure of this information, investors are better equipped to optimize their decisions on how best to
allocate their limited capital. For the sake of clarity, regulators do not
determine the quality of a particular offering under these laws; instead
they equip investors with the necessary information to make such determinations on their own.100 Issuers who fail to disclose such material information, either purposely or inadvertently, can be exposed to substantial
civil liabilities under various provisions of the Securities Act.101
This obligation to provide material information hinges on the legal definition of security, which includes a long list of financial instruments as
well as the catch-all “investment contract.”102 Congress included this
catch-all term to capture issuers who tried to evade the Act’s arduous
registration requirements by simply renaming their offered securities.103
Investment contracts include investment schemes where investors are
called to invest money in a common enterprise, and are led to expect
profits, solely from the efforts of others.104 With respect to investment
company structures, investors in these vehicles receive an ownership interest in the underlying vehicle in exchange for their investment of capital.105 Investors then receive a pro rata share of the pool’s profits.106 As
such, investment companies must register under the Securities Act,107 unless an available exclusion or exemption applies to its underlying ownership interests offered to investors.108 Once investment companies offer
ownership interest to the general public, they must complete a detailed
prospectus document that is publicly available on the SEC’s website.109
They are also subject to civil liability for material misstatements and
omissions that appear on the registration statement.110
The Exchange Act was passed in 1934, shortly after the adoption of the
Securities Act. While the Securities Act primarily regulates the flow of
information related to the initial issuance of securities, the Exchange Act
regulates the disclosure of information related to securities traded on the
secondary markets.111 Broadly prohibiting fraud in connection with the
sale of securities is also an integral component of this legislation.112 Issu99. Id.
100. Marianne M. Jennings, The Efficacy of Merit Preview of Common Stock Offerings:
Do Regulators Know More Than the Market?, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 211, 212 (1993).
101. Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q (2012); Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j,
78ff (2012).
102. Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
103. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60–61 (1990).
104. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
105. Investment Companies, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/
mfinvco.htm [https://perma.cc/MGC8-HWCP].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c.
109. See id. §§ 77j, 77a; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 105.
110. Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77q; Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78ff
(2012).
111. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 98.
112. See Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78ff.
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ers that fall within the definition of “public company” must comply with
the periodic disclosure requirements under the Exchange Act.113 The definition of public company under the Exchange Act includes the following
three categories of issuers: (1) issuers that have securities listed on an
exchange;114 (2) issuers with “total assets” exceeding $10 million and classes of equity securities held by at least 2,000 persons (or 500 persons who
are not accredited investors);115 and (3) any issuer that files a registration
statement under the Securities Act.116 Investment company structures
could potentially fall under any of these categories due to their size, number of holders, or registration status under the Securities Act. As a result,
investment companies must file the periodic reports mandated under the
Exchange Act unless an available exclusion or exemption applies to the
underlying entity.117
3. Commodity Exchange Act
To the extent that investment company advisers trade in futures or
other derivatives on behalf of an underlying pool, they may also be subject to registration requirements under the Commodity Exchange Act.118
As briefly discussed above, securities are regulated by the SEC, while
futures and other derivatives are regulated by the CFTC.119 Securities
typically encompass financial instruments that represent an ownership interest in a particular company.120 In contrast, derivatives encompass financial instruments “whose price[s] [are] dependent upon or derived
from one or more underlying assets.”121 Such “underlying assets” can include commodities, securities, currencies, indexes, and other such instruments. Agricultural futures are a well-known example of derivatives as
they are contracts whose value depends on price fluctuations in underlying commodities, such as corn, wheat, and soybeans.122 Hedgers rely on
derivatives to ensure a fixed price on a particular instrument, while spec113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. § 78l; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 98.
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a).
Id. § 78l(g).
Id. § 78l(l).
Id. § 78l(g).
Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6 (2012).
The CFTC’s mission includes the following initiatives:
[P]olice[ ] the derivatives markets for various abuses and work[ ] to ensure
the protection of customer funds. Further, the agency seeks to lower the risk
of the futures and swaps markets to the economy and the public.

To fulfill these roles, the Commission oversees designated contract markets,
swap execution facilities, derivatives clearing organizations, swap data repositories, swap dealers, futures commission merchants, commodity pool operators and other intermediaries.
Mission & Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/
About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm [https://perma.cc/W882-L2FJ].
120. Security, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/security.asp [https://
perma.cc/RAC8-A3LR].
121. Derivative, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.asp
[https://perma.cc/BKC5-7M22].
122. See id.
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ulators use such contracts to bet on predicted price fluctuations.123
Investment company advisers that utilize trading strategies in both securities and derivatives markets must comply with the layers of regulation
imposed under each of these frameworks unless there is an available exemption or exclusion. More specifically, if investment company advisers
fall within the definition of “commodity pool operator” (CPO) or “commodity trading adviser” (CTA), then they must automatically register
with the CFTC.124 CPOs generally include any “individual or organization which operates a commodity pool and solicits funds for that commodity pool.”125 A “commodity pool” is defined as “an enterprise in
which funds contributed by a number of persons are combined for the
purpose of trading futures contracts or commodity options, retail off-exchange forex contracts or swaps, or to invest in another commodity
pool.”126 Thus, investment company advisers that invest fund assets into
the derivative instruments provided above could fall under the definition
of CPO, and the law would identify the underlying fund as a commodity
pool. Relatedly, CTAs include “an individual or organization which, for
compensation or profit, advises others . . . as to the value of or the advisability of buying or selling futures contracts, commodity options, retail offexchange forex contracts or swaps.”127 Hence, investment company advisers that invest fund assets into derivative instruments could concurrently fall under the definitions of CPO and CTA. Registered CPOs and
CTAs must comply with the intricate system of rules and regulations specifically prescribed by the Commodity Exchange Act, which includes additional disclosure obligations, filing fees, recordkeeping requirements,
and many other mandates.128
RICs previously relied on the exclusion provided under CFTC Rule 4.5
to avoid duplicative regulation by the CFTC, since the SEC already had
extensive oversight over these entities under the 1940 Act, Advisers Act,
Securities Act, and Exchange Act, as discussed herein.129 Mandating
comparable regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act would likely
result in excessive and unnecessary compliance costs, which inevitably get
passed down to underlying investors. Other regulated entities such as
pension plans and insurance companies similarly relied on CFTC Rule 4.5
to avoid redundant regulation.130 In 2012 however, pursuant to its ex123. MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES 4-5 (2006).
124. CPO/CTA Registration Requirements Under Dodd-Frank, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP:
NEWS & INSIGHTS (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.sidley.com/news/cpocta-registration-require
ments-under-dodd-frank-09-07-2010 [https://perma.cc/AK2L-HV5A].
125. Commodity Pool Operators, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, https://www.nfa.futures.org/
NFA-compliance/NFA-commodity-pool-operators/index.HTML [https://perma.cc/95XDBWA7].
126. Id.
127. Commodity Trading Advisors, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, https://www.nfa.futures.org/
NFA-compliance/NFA-commodity-trading-advisors/index.HTML [https://perma.cc/4T3ZCP7U].
128. See id.; NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, supra note 125.
129. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.5 (2016).
130. See id.
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panded authority granted under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC
amended Rule 4.5 to add a requirement that entities relying on this exemption limit derivatives trading activities that do not constitute bona
fide hedging trades to “a de minimis level of the fund’s total assets.”131
This amendment forced hundreds of RICs to register with the CFTC, in
spite of the unified resistance amongst numerous industry participants.132
The CFTC quickly responded to this opposition by passing harmonization
rules in 2012, which seek to resolve “conflict, inconsistency, and duplication with SEC-administered disclosure, reporting and recordkeeping by
RICs.”133 The specific registration requirements for RICs under the
Commodity Exchange Act will likely evolve over time as the SEC and
CFTC continuously update the application of these harmonization rules
to newly registered RICs.
C. INDICATORS

OF

PUBLICNESS EMBEDDED

IN

EXEMPTIONS

Congress has not provided a definition of public in any of the federal
securities laws enumerated above. The term first appeared in the private
offering exemption under the Securities Act, where Congress carved out
offerings from regulation that did not invoke a public concern.134 This
exclusion is supported by the notion that regulators should not oversee
activities that would not have an adverse impact on the public in terms of
investor protection, capital formation, and market integrity. The SEC, as
well as the Supreme Court, have subsequently attempted to provide clarification to this term through a series of releases, cases, and rules. Accordingly, this section begins by briefly delineating these various
interpretations of the term public.
Congress followed suit, incorporating indicators of publicness into the
numerous exemptions and exclusions under each of the federal securities
laws. With respect to investment companies, these laws attach to different
components of an investment company structure, which complicates the
process of identifying common indicators of publicness. The Securities
Act, for example, examines publicness in terms of the ownership interests
offered to investment company investors. In contrast, the Exchange Act
131. Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors: Compliance Obligations, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,252-01, 11,252, 11,283 (Feb. 24, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 4, 145, 147); Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors: Compliance Obligations, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,328-01, 17,328 (Mar. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 4, 145, 147) (correcting 77 Fed. Reg. at 11,252-01, 11,283); Tom Watterson,
Attention Mutual Funds–Potential Relief for CPO and CTA Regulation in the 2014 CFTC
Reauthorization Act, REED SMITH LLP: THE SWAP REPORT (Aug. 29, 2014), http://
www.theswapreport.com/2014/08/articles/cpo-cta-registration/attention-mutual-fundspotential-relief-for-cpo-and-cta-regulation-in-the-2014-cftc-reauthorization-act/ [https://
perma.cc/GW4N-LPLR].
132. History of Rule 4.5, INV. CO. INST. (Apr. 17, 2012) https://www.ici.org/pdf/12_com
mod_inv_hist_rule4.5.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZNB-YCRL].
133. Harmonization of Compliance Obligations for Registered Investment Companies
Required to Register as Commodity Pool Operators, 78 Fed. Reg. 52,308-01, 58,308–09,
52,312 (Aug. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 4).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012).
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examines the publicness of the overall investment company entity. The
Advisers Act and the Commodity Exchange Act, on the other hand, examine the publicness of the advisers charged with managing such pools.
In spite of these varying perspectives of publicness, common indicators
arise with respect to these exemptions. Such indicators reference the following characteristics: status of investors, size of pool, number of investors/clients, and advertising. This section concludes by highlighting the
common exemptions that incorporate these common indicators of
publicness.
1. Original Indicators of Publicness
In passing the foundational Securities Act, Congress specifically noted
that the laws were not intended to cover transactions “where the public
benefits are too remote.”135 The logic behind this exclusion is readily apparent, as the federal laws should only apply to activities that have a significant impact on the collective public. To the extent that an offering
solely affects a finite number of investors and has no lasting impact on the
government or other unsuspecting third parties, then the law should indeed exclude such offerings from regulation. Section 4(2) of the Securities Act codifies the original wishes of Congress, as the private offering
exemption specifically carves out any transaction not involving a public
offering.136 The challenge has been defining publicness: Congress failed
to provide a precise definition in this inaugural legislation. This possibly
resulted from this legislation’s hurried passage.137 Supporters sought to
capitalize on the strong political support that resulted from the Great
Depression.138
The SEC initially undertook the task of defining public offerings when
it provided additional guidance in a 1935 SEC Release. This release included an evaluation of the following countervailing factors in defining
public offerings: “(1) [t]he number of offerees and their relationship to
each other and to the issuer[,] . . . (2) [t]he number of units offered[,] . . .
(3) [t]he size of the offering,” and “(4) [t]he manner of offering.”139 Issuers wishing to structure private offerings would have to weigh each of
these factors to determine whether securities offerings were public.140
With respect to the first factor, evaluating the relationship of offerees to
the issuer implies that access to information creates a boundary of publicness related to the status of investors. More specifically, investors who
have access to material information related to the issuer are better able to
135. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
137. SELIGMAN, supra note 87, at 52 (“[President] Roosevelt was determined to draft
and quickly submit to Congress a securities bill that could be voted on while he still enjoyed the extraordinary political support generated by the bank crisis.”).
138. Id.
139. Letter of General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 285, 1935 WL 27785 (Jan.
24, 1935).
140. Id.
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protect themselves, decreasing the need for federal protection. In applying the second and third factors, evaluating the number of units offered as
well as the size of the offering implies that the likeliness of publicness
increases with the overall size of a particular offering. Larger funds tend
to have a greater impact on the general public due to their trading volume, intermediary relationships, and the high number of investors that
are dependent upon the underlying returns. In applying the last factor,
which evaluates the manner of the offerings, publicness is implied when
issuers engage in advertising that reaches a large number of offerees.
The Supreme Court famously narrowed the focus of publicness in SEC
v. Ralston Purina Co.141 In this case, the Court held that an offering to
those who can “fend for themselves” is a transaction “not involving any
public offering.”142 The status of investors seemed to be the primary focus
of the Court in outlining the contours of publicness. The Court reasoned
that if the offerees have access to the same type of information that
would be available in a registration statement, then they do not need the
protections guaranteed under the federal securities laws. Executive employees of the issuer, for example, would be a category of investors who
could appropriately fend for themselves given their direct and immediate
access to material information related to the issuer.143 With respect to
evaluating the size of the offering, as well as the number of offerees, the
Court seemed to imply that these factors were not as relevant.144 An offering to a single investor, who could not appropriately fend for himself
or herself, could still constitute a public offering. Even still, the Court did
not directly address the extent to which the “manner of the offering” constituted publicness and issuers were not entirely clear as to the level of
sophistication required to rely on this holding.
In 1982, to mitigate the uncertainty of publicness, the SEC promulgated Regulation D, a safe harbor providing an alternative framework for
ensuring compliance with Section 4(2).145 Among the rules included
within this regulation are Rules 504, 505, and 506, through each of which
the SEC intended to provide clear standards for constructing private offerings.146 The bright-line standards incorporated into each rule directly
correlate to the original indicators of publicness provided under the 1935
SEC Release. Issuers must comply with specific restrictions on aggregate
offering price, number and status of purchasers, and advertising in order
to rely on each of these rules.147 With respect to the status of investors,
Regulation D coined the new term “accredited investor,” which provides
141. 346 U.S. 119, 120 (1953).
142. Id. at 125 (internal quotations omitted).
143. Id. at 125–26.
144. Id. at 125.
145. James R. Tanenbaum & Anna T. Pinedo, The Law: Legal and Regulatory Framework, in PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY 80 (Steven
Dresner & E. Kurt Kim eds., 2d ed. 2006); see Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.508
(2016).
146. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.508.
147. Id.
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a clear definition of investors who can adequately fend for themselves.148
Individuals who earn over $200,000 per year, as well as a variety of institutions, are included in this definition.149 Regulation D also provided a
foundational definition of the term advertising and integrated varying degrees of restrictions under Rules 504, 505, and 506.150
Rule 506 is the most common exemption relied upon by Private Funds,
as it allows issuers to raise an unlimited amount of capital—i.e., it places
no restrictions on aggregate offering price—if purchasers are limited to
accredited investors.151 Rule 506 issuers cannot accept more than thirtyfive retail investors, and such retail investors must be deemed “sophisticated” as defined under Regulation D.152 In comparison, Rule 504 issuers
can raise capital from an unlimited number of unsophisticated retail investors, but the aggregate offering price is $1 million.153 Investment companies previously had to sacrifice the power to advertise in order to rely
on Rule 506, but this historic indicator of publicness has been partially
eradicated with the passage of the JOBS Act.154 Under the JOBS Act,
issuers that rely on Rule 506 are now permitted to advertise such private
offerings broadly, but retail investors still have limited access to Private
Funds.155
2. 1940 Act Exemptions
The most common exemption provided under the 1940 Act similarly
focuses on the status of investors in outlining the contours of publicness.
Section 3(c)(7) was passed under the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, which sought “to amend the [1940 Act] to promote more efficient management of mutual funds, protect investors, and
provide more effective and less burdensome regulation.”156 Under this
exemption, funds that restrict offerings to “qualified purchasers” are considered private and can thus offer interests to such investors without having to comply with the rigors of the 1940 Act.157 Qualified purchasers are
similar to accredited investors, but are subject to higher net-worth re148. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
149. Id. Pursuant to authority granted under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC staff recently published a report that provides a number of recommendations to revise the “accredited investor” definition. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF
THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR” 90, (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/
corpfin/reportspubs/special-studies/review-definition-of-accredited-investor-12-18-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AAL8-SMGV] (noting that one such recommendation suggests that the
income and net-worth thresholds be updated to adjust for inflation).
150. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c).
151. See Tanenbaum & Pinedo, supra note 145, at 81; 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 230.504.
154. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306,
313 (2012).
155. Id.
156. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416, 3416 (1996).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2012).
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quirements.158 They include institutions that own at least $5,000,000 in
investments as well as any natural person who owns not less than
$5,000,000 in investments.159 With these higher net-worth requirements,
Congress likely viewed this exemption as being the perfect solution to
facilitate capital formation in the industry without compromising investor
protection for this subset of investors. Given that entities could easily
comply with this exemption’s requirements, the exemption could have
contributed to the massive growth of the Private Fund industry. Once a
fund restricts investors to qualified purchasers, it can raise an unlimited
amount of capital from an unlimited number of such investors.160
Section 3(c)(1) is another common exemption provided under the 1940
Act, but it instead focuses on the number of investors in measuring the
contours of publicness.161 Under this provision, if a fund restricts its number of investors to 100 beneficial owners, then it is exempt from the arduous registration requirements prescribed under the 1940 Act.162 A fund
that relies on Section 3(c)(1) must also restrict its offerings to accredited
investors and cannot “propose to make a public offering of its securities.”163 This emphasis on number of investors is consistent with Congress’s belief that smaller pools, with a limited number of investors, are
private in nature because they will likely have a minimal impact on the
general public.164 As stated in the congressional hearings related to the
passage of the 1940 Act:
A family may have a substantial estate and has invested its money in
marketable securities. In essence that is a private investment company, is it not? We do not want any part of it; and so we have said
that even though you engage in the same type of activity as an investment company, which is within the purview of this section, if you
have less than 100 security holders you are not a public investment
company and not within the purview of this legislation.165
As such, smaller funds relying on the 3(c)(1) exemption may participate in the same investment activities as their registered counterparts.166
However, section 3(c)(1) is not quite as popular as section 3(c)(7) within
the Private Fund industry given this stringent limit on the number of
investors.167
158. Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i).
159. Id. §§ 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i), (ii).
160. Id. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A). Private Funds that rely on this provision must still restrict
their number of investors to 2,000 in order to avoid the registration requirements under the
Exchange Act. Id. § 781(g).
161. 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY, supra note 53, at 105–06.
165. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong. 179 (1940).
166. Id.
167. Helen Parry, Hedge Funds, Hot Markets and the High Net Worth Investor: A Case
for Greater Protection?, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 703, 704 (2001).
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3. Ancillary Law Exemptions
Unlike the Securities Act, which focuses on status of investors to evaluate whether offerings are public, the Exchange Act focuses on the size of
the entity as well as the number of investors in examining the contours of
publicness. Professors Langevoort and Thompson have recently noted the
inconsistent treatment of publicness under the Securities Act and Exchange Act, which is not necessarily supported theoretically.168 Nevertheless, these inconsistent indicators appear under Section 12(g) of the
Exchange Act, which excludes issuers from the Act’s periodic disclosure
requirements if “total assets” do not exceed $10 million and classes of
equity securities are not held by 500 or more investors.169 Private Funds
frequently relied on this provision to evade regulation by restricting the
total number of investors to 499.170 The JOBS Act, however, has since
made it easier to exclude Private Funds from Section 12(g) by increasing
the triggering threshold of investors to 2,000 persons, or 500 persons or
more who are not “accredited investors.”171
With respect to the Advisers Act, a common indicator of publicness
previously included the number of clients managed by an adviser, which
was incorporated under the now defunct Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act.172 This provision exempted advisers from regulation if they advised fewer than fifteen clients and did not hold themselves out to the
public as RIAs or act as advisers to RICs. In applying this provision, each
individual fund managed by an adviser was counted as a single client,
irrespective of the total number of investors within such fund. Thus, if an
adviser managed a single fund which had 100 underlying investors, the
adviser could still rely on Rule 203(b)(3) without violating the fifteen client threshold.173 However, the Dodd-Frank Act recently repealed Section 203(b)(3) in an attempt to capture the large number of Private Fund
advisers that were evading regulation under the federal securities laws.174
With respect to the Commodity Exchange Act, common indicators of
publicness similarly include status of investors. For example, the most
common exemption provided under the now defunct CFTC Rule
168. Langevoort & Thompson Article, supra note 24, at 339.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2012).
170. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds: Staff
Report to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 13 (2003) [hereinafter
SEC STAFF REPORT], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [https://
perma.cc/87VY-RCV7].
171. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g).
172. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 170, at 21. It should also be noted that, under the
Advisers Act, Private Fund advisers are prohibited from charging performance fees (which
are calculated as a percentage of investment profits generated by a particular fund), unless
they restrict investments to “qualified clients.” 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d) (2016). This class
of investors includes a “natural person who, or a company that, immediately after entering
into the contract has at least $1,000,000 under the management of the investment adviser[.]” Id. As a result, most Private Fund advisers also limit investors to qualified clients
so that they can freely charge performance fees to such investors.
173. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 170, at 21.
174. See infra Part III.B.1 for further explanation of the implications of this change.
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4.13(a)(4) was similar to Section 3(c)(7) under the 1940 Act in that it
relied on the status of investors as the primary proxy for publicness.175
Under this exemption, if Private Funds restricted investments to “qualified eligible purchasers” then they were exempt from regulation.176 These
investors encompass several categories of high-net-worth individual and
institutional investors, including qualified purchasers as defined under the
1940 Act.177 However, this exemption was recently repealed by the CFTC
under authority granted pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act given Congress’s expressed desire to further regulate the derivatives markets.178
Private Funds that restrict offerings to qualified eligible purchasers can
still rely on CFTC Rule 4.7, which provides such funds relief from certain
reporting and disclosure requirements mandated under the Commodity
Exchange Act.179 Private Funds can also rely on CFTC rule 4.13(a)(3),
which exempts funds that trade de minimis levels of futures
instruments.180
III. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO EVOLVING NOTIONS
OF PUBLICNESS
Since the passage of the federal securities laws, regulators have consistently altered indicators of publicness to accommodate financial innovation and to support capital formation. For instance, the SEC promulgated
Regulation D under the Securities Act to create bright-line standards of
publicness, which led to a significant expansion of private offerings.181
Issuers were no longer forced to rely on the unpredictable indicators of
publicness provided under previous Supreme Court opinions and SEC
releases. Similarly, the Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exemptions provided
under the 1940 Act made it easier for Private Funds to evade this legislation’s incredibly restrictive mandates. Private Funds relying on these exemptions would often pursue innovative strategies that were largely
unavailable to their registered counterparts. A large number of elite investors took advantage of this increased access to financial innovation as
they frequently sought creative mechanisms for diversifying returns and
managing risk. As a result, the Private Fund industry has grown substantially in recent decades.
175. Jeffrey D. Collins & Diana W. Lo, CFTC Repeals Rule 4.13(a)(4) Exemption from
Registration and Amends Rule 4.13(a)(3), FOLEY HOAG LLP: THE FOLEY ADVISOR (Apr.
19, 2012), http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-updates/2012/april/cftc-repeals
-rule-4-13a4-exemption-from-registration-and-amends-rule-4-13a3 [https://perma.cc/
R2QV-MSDZ].
176. Id.
177. 17 C.F.R. § 4.7(a)(2) (2016).
178. Collins & Lo, supra note 175.
179. 17 C.F.R. § 4.7(b).
180. 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(3) (2016).
181. Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole 35 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 151, 173–79 (2010) (examining extent to which private placement industry has grown in
response to Regulation D).
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However, with the exponential growth of Private Funds, regulators
grew increasingly concerned with the abilities of such entities adversely to
affect the general public. This Part thus examines how the expansion of
the Private Fund industry invoked public concerns such as systemic risk,
retailization, and shadow banking. It continues by outlining Congress’s
response to these concerns under the Dodd-Frank Act, which has since
expanded indicators of publicness in the Private Fund industry. This law
incorporates these expansions under the Advisers Act and Commodity
Exchange Act, instead of focusing on the industry’s core regulation under
the 1940 Act. Part III concludes by exploring the investor protection
harms that have resulted from this inadequate focus on ancillary laws,
which include over-inclusive and under-inclusive indicators of publicness
under the 1940 Act.
A. PRIVATE FUNDS INVOKE “PUBLIC” CONCERNS
As of April 2015, hedge funds managed a total of $3.125 trillion in the
United States,182 while private equity funds managed $1.5 trillion.183 One
study predicted that hedge funds will manage a total of $5.8 trillion in
2018.184 In spite of reports that hedge funds have not consistently beat
the markets in recent years, the industry is likely to continue its exponential growth particularly since it has access to innovative strategies and
instruments that are not available to its registered counterparts. Institutional investors such as pension plans, endowments, and insurance companies are increasingly investing in private funds and a 2015 study
administered by J.P. Morgan found that 94% of such investors plan to
maintain or increase hedge fund investments in the coming years.185 Such
investors are generally attracted to the diversification opportunities afforded by Private Funds, as well as their unique abilities to earn returns
in declining markets.
This rapid growth has been accompanied by new regulatory concerns
that Private Funds are perhaps engaging in activities that could imply
greater degrees of publicness. Most importantly, Private Funds are not
constrained by the capital restrictions provided under Section 18 of the
1940 Act, which requires that registered funds maintain at least 300%
asset coverage for any leveraged transaction, and that advisers be sufficiently “covered” before trading in derivatives.186 These flexibilities create a risk that a particular fund could default on a debt obligation with an
investment bank counterparty, thereby exposing such bank to the risk of
failure. To the extent that a fund, or series of funds, has relationships with
several counterparties, such correlated defaults could expose the broader
182. EVESTMENT, supra note 16.
183. Jacobius, supra note 17.
184. Touryalai, supra note 20.
185. Capital Introduction Group Institutional Investor Survey – 2015, J.P. MORGAN 60
(2015), https://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/JPM-Capital-Introduc
tion-Group-2015-Institutional-Investor-Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB4A-J3NZ].
186. Shelby, Privileged Access Article, supra note 19, at 347.
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economy to a financial calamity.187 This phenomenon falls under the category of systemic risk, which generally refers to “the possibility that an
event at the company level could trigger severe instability or collapse an
entire industry or economy.”188
One of the earliest incidents that shed light on these emerging systemic
risk concerns occurred in 1998 with the near failure of Long-Term-Capital
Management (LTCM), a large hedge fund organized by the top talent in
the industry. The organizers of LTCM included two Nobel Prize winners
who were highly successful in the fund’s first years of operation—they
initially raised billions of dollars from investors.189 However, an unanticipated “flight to quality” on a global scale caused unanticipated shifts in
the markets, leading to massive losses of the fund’s portfolio.190 LTCM’s
resulting losses were so severe, and its leverage so exceedingly high, that
it was set to default on over $1 trillion in debt to a number of prominent
investment banks. If these defaults would have actually occurred, the resulting losses to the investment banks would have single-handedly crippled the economy. The Federal Reserve orchestrated a private deal
amongst LTCM’s counterparties to prevent the default of these obligations. The near-failure of LTCM created a political backlash against the
industry because it highlighted the possibility that private entities could
have a significant, adverse impact on the general public.191 This of course
challenged the private-public divide as losses incurred by a private entity
should theoretically be constrained to such entity, as opposed to reaching
unsuspecting third parties.
Relatedly, hedge funds became active participants in the “shadow
banking” industry,192 which refers to a network of “financial intermediaries involved in facilitating the creation of credit across the
187. Andrew W. Lo, Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008:
Written Testimony for the House Oversight Committee on Hedge Funds, 3–4 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301217 [https://perma.cc/GF5M-7BUH]; Luis
A. Aguilar, Speech by SEC Comm’r: Hedge Fund Regulation on the Horizon - Don’t Shoot
the Messenger, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 18, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/ 2009/spch061809laa.htm [https://perma.cc/2Z9L-4FQ4]; Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for
a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 163–64 (2011).
188. Systemic Risk, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/systemicrisk.asp [https://perma.cc/V7L6-CZPB].
189. Stephanie Yang, The Epic Story of How a ‘Genius’ Hedge Fund Almost Caused a
Global Financial Meltdown, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 10, 2014), http://www.businessinsider
.com/the-fall-of-long-term-capital-management-2014-7 [https://perma.cc/4YRC-T9PJ].
190. THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 12 (1999).
191. Id. at 13–14, 29.
192. Karin Matussek, Hedge Funds Are Shadow Banks in Need of Regulation, Bafin
Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2012-05-13/hedge-funds-are-shadow-banks-in-need-of-regulation-bafin-says [https://
perma.cc/3TTG-3JCB]. But see The Role of Credit Hedge Funds in the Financial System:
Asset Managers, Not Shadow Banks, ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N 3 (Mar. 2012), http://
www.aima.org/en/document-summary/index.cfm/docid/129E55F5-AF6C-471FB30DA4A33B40A8EB [https://perma.cc/G6MU-JVGF] (arguing that the hedge fund industry is a part of the asset management sector, as opposed to shadow banking, and further
arguing that “hedge funds generally do not engage directly in credit transformation”).
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global financial system, but whose members are not subject to regulatory
oversight.”193 While credit was historically created and managed by large
banking institutions subject to prudential regulation, innovative financial
instruments such as credit default obligations (CDOs), credit default
swaps (CDS), and other exotic derivatives, created a mechanism for Private Funds to participate directly in such credit markets.194 These instruments essentially gave banks the power to repackage and sell debt to a
variety of market participants, which led to a robust credit market that
evaded regulation under the federal securities laws.195 Given that hedge
funds have flexibility to trade unlimited derivatives, they are active participants in these markets. Some have estimated that “hedge funds were
responsible for over one-third of [credit derivative] contracts sold
through 2006” and “55% of all trading volume [in the plain vanilla credit
derivative industry].”196
Hedge funds, and other private entities, provided the necessary liquidity to fuel the growth of these markets, which expanded the availability of
credit to market participants across the globe.197 This unprecedented
growth, however, precipitated the financial crisis of 2007–2010 (Great
Recession), as the rampant speculation in these instruments, coupled with
the lack of regulatory oversight, eventually led to massive defaults that
crippled the global economy.198 Although the investment banks that created these instruments have been identified as the major culprit in facilitating the crisis, the ongoing presence of Private Funds in facilitating the
demand of such instruments created unique regulatory concerns.199 For
example, numerous commentators have queried whether Magnetar, a
massive Chicago based hedge fund, helped to resuscitate the housing
bubble through its speculative trading activities in complex mortgagebacked securities.200 In late 2005, just as the housing market was beginning to deflate, Magnetar brokered deals with several banks to invest in
193. Shadow Banking System, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
shadow-banking-system.asp [https://perma.cc/6ZXF-CWGT].
194. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REP. 27–38
(2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/
52MG-UQ6S] (discussing the shadow banking system and its role in the 2008 financial
crisis).
195. Id. at 27. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, credit derivatives were not subject to regulatory oversight by the CFTC. See id. at 48.
196. DAVID P. STOWELL, INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY
234 (2d ed. 2013).
197. CATE REAVIS, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008: THE ROLE OF GREED,
FEAR, AND OLIGARCHS 6–7 (2012), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/LearningEdge/CaseDocs/09093%20The%20Financial%20Crisis%20of%202008.rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ2BGK87].
198. Id.
199. E.g., James Richards, Repeal of Glass-Steagall Caused the Financial Crisis, USNEWS (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/
08/27/repeal-of-glass-steagall-caused-the-financial-crisis [https://perma.cc/8ZWR-6BR9].
200. Stephen Gandel, Even Housing Bears Bought Big Homes Before the Crash, FORTUNE (Apr. 1, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/04/01/even-housing-bears-bought-big-homesbefore-the-crash/ [https://perma.cc/7LKF-6WH6]; Jesse Eisinger and Jake Bernstein, The
Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the Bubble Going, PROPUBLICA
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the riskiest portion of various CDOs. Some estimates have found that
Magnetar controlled up to half of the total volume of these toxic investments. Because Magnetar protected itself from these toxic assets through
its simultaneous investment in CDS instruments, Magnetar earned record
profits when the housing bubble eventually burst.201
The participation of Private Funds in these toxic markets leads to provocative questions about whether the underlying activities of such entities
can appropriately be classified as private. On the one hand, these vehicles
are not available for direct investment by retail investors, which shields
the general public from the heightened risk associated with investing in
these kinds of risky instruments. Furthermore, in analyzing the performance of Private Funds on a micro level, many were able to shield their
elite investors from excessive losses. If not, one could still argue that any
excessive losses were constrained to such elite investors and did not spill
over to the general marketplace (which is inapposite to the scenario resulting from the near-failure of LTCM). And in some cases, such as in the
Magnetar example provided above, hedge funds were able to earn a sizable return for their underlying investors by appropriately hedging against
such risky bets. This analysis would be consistent with traditional notions
of publicness, which are rooted in determining whether investors can appropriately fend for themselves.
However, if we examine these examples in terms of “public effect” as
opposed to status of investors, the assessment of publicness dramatically
changes. To the extent that private entities are speculating on toxic instruments that could eventually lead to a crisis, such entities are perhaps—if
not in fact—engaged in activities that are more public in nature. The vast
participation in these markets by Private Funds could also create perverse incentives that spur the growth of toxic markets, irrespective of the
resulting harms to the broader economy. Private Fund advisers could, for
example, be incentivized to encourage investment banks to create toxic
instruments, through either these advisers’ relationships or their bargaining power, so that they can secretly hedge against such trades and earn
massive profits.202 Many alleged that Magnetar engaged in these sorts of
activities unbeknownst to its bank counterparties.203 A range of regulatory solutions have been considered by numerous commentators, such as
creating an administrative body to prescreen innovative products before
they are traded on the financial markets,204 or prohibiting the trading of

(Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/all-the-magnetar-trade-how-one-hedgefund-helped-keep-the-housing-bubble [https://perma.cc/HNG9-EV4G].
201. See Eisinger & Bernstein, supra note 200.
202. See id.
203. Id.
204. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the
Insurable Interest Doctrine to 21st Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307
(2013) (proposing that an administrative agency comparable to the FDA prescreen new
financial instruments before they enter the markets).
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such instruments altogether.205 Congress likely grappled with comparable
questions and solutions in creating the new regulatory framework for
OTC derivatives under the Dodd-Frank Act, which will be further discussed below.206
The retailization of Private Funds has also strained the private-public
divide in the investment company industry.207 As background, investment
companies such as mutual funds and money-market funds are automatically deemed public because they are available for direct investment by
retail investors. This is consistent with the deeply embedded notion that
members of the general public do not have the resources sufficient to
protect themselves from the often riskier strategies employed by hedge
funds and other private vehicles. However, since pension plans typically
qualify as both accredited investors and qualified purchasers under the
Securities Act and 1940 Act, respectively, they frequently invest in the
Private Fund industry. This phenomenon challenges traditional notions of
publicness as the underlying retail investors of pension plans are indirectly exposed to Private Funds.
This retailization of Private Funds is set to increase in coming years. In
2014 for example, the Pennsylvania Public School Employees’ Retirement System allocated 10.5% of its plan assets into hedge funds, the Public School and Education Employee Retirement Systems of Missouri
allocated 13.7%, and the Texas County & District Retirement System allocated 25% of its assets into hedge funds.208 Institutional investors are
increasingly seeking Private Fund investments because of the large universe of strategies that are simply unavailable in the registered fund
space. Such strategies provide institutional investors with unique diversification and hedging opportunities. As one commentator noted, “public
pension funds are expected to be the main driver of growth in the alternatives space going forward.”209
B. ANCILLARY LAW FOCUS

UNDER

DODD-FRANK ACT

Congress, as well as the SEC, sanctioned studies to investigate these
heightened concerns with respect to the Private Fund industry.210 These
studies did indeed confirm that Private Funds could increase systemic risk
205. James Rickards, Derivatives Should Be Banned from Financial Markets, USNEWS
(July 16, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/07/16/de
rivatives-should-be-banned-from-financial-markets [https://perma.cc/BMA6-YGKZ].
206. See discussion infra Part III.B.
207. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 170, at 80–82.
208. Williamson, supra note 21.
209. Tim Ng, The Role of Hedge Funds in Institutional Portfolios, PENSIONS & INVS.
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.pionline.com/article/20150203/ONLINE/150209962/the-role-ofhedge-funds-in-institutional-portfolios [https://perma.cc/3CQU-8NHR].
210. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING
STABILITY (Jan. 2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT47018/pdf/CPRT111JPRT47018.pdf [https://perma.cc/PD37-F99S]; see also SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note
170.
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levels in the broader economy. One study noted that, “[i]f highly leveraged hedge funds are forced to liquidate assets at fire-sale prices, these
asset classes may sustain heavy losses. This can lead to further defaults or
threaten systemically important institutions not only directly as
counterparties or creditors, but also indirectly through asset price adjustments . . . .”211 While the regulators generally seemed eager to implement
some form of regulation over Private Funds, original indicators of publicness embedded in our federal securities laws, such as status of investors
and number of investors/clients, did not sufficiently measure systemic risk.
In contrast, information regarding a Private Fund’s interconnectedness,
substitutability, complexity, and global activities could possibly act as
meaningful indicators of systemic risk, but these categories of activities
were not historically monitored under federal securities laws.212 Such activities were typically created by banks and monitored by accompanying
banking regulators, making it difficult for Congress seamlessly to integrate Private Funds into the federal securities laws rubric.
In spite of these difficulties, Congress eventually responded to these
systemic risk concerns by creating new registration requirements for Private Funds under the Dodd-Frank Act. Its passage effectively demonstrated that historical indicators of publicness, such as status of investors,
for example, no longer provided sufficient boundaries in delineating private and public investment companies. Instead of revamping the primary
legislation provided under the 1940 Act directly to integrate these evolving notions of publicness, Congress instead focused on the ancillary laws
such as the Advisers Act and the Commodity Exchange Act. This section
summarizes these new registration requirements, as well as the new
power of the SEC to collect confidential and proprietary information
from Private Funds, and to report such information to a newly created
agency, the Financial Stability and Oversight Council (FSOC).
1. Advisers Act Registration for Private Funds
The Dodd-Frank Act essentially eliminated Section 203(b)(3) of the
Advisers Act,213 which was the most common exemption that Private
Fund advisers previously relied on to avoid regulation under the Advisers
Act. Congress then incorporated an official definition for Private Funds
under the Dodd-Frank Act, which encompasses any issuer that relies on
the exemptions provided under Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the 1940
Act.214 This definition effectively captured the large number of Private
211. Reint Gropp, How Important Are Hedge Funds in a Crisis?, FRBSF ECONOMIC
LETTER (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economicletter/2014/april/hedge-fund-risk-measurement-spillover-economic-crisis [https://perma.cc/
8LVT-49NF].
212. See discussion infra Part V.A.
213. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
214. § 402, 124 Stat. at 1570 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(29)). Private
Funds were previously defined in this article as any investment company that was exempt
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Funds that relied on Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the 1940 Act to avoid
the arduous requirements that normally apply to RICs. All such Private
Funds must now register under the Advisers Act, unless there is an available exemption. Congress did adopt numerous exemptions from this new
registration requirement,215 one of which includes advisers that only advise Private Funds and have assets under management in the United
States of less than $150,000,000.216 In addition, managed futures funds
and other funds that hold a limited amount of securities are excluded
from the definition of Private Funds under the Dodd-Frank Act and thus
are not required to register.217 Family offices, venture capital funds, and
certain foreign advisers are also exempt from registration.218
For the sake of clarity, Private Funds are not required to register under
the 1940 Act, in spite of Congress’s reference to the 1940 Act exemptions
in defining this term. The Advisers Act creates additional disclosure obligations and fiduciary duties for registered advisers, but has a minimal effect on the actual funds managed by advisers. Specific limits on leverage
and derivatives trading would only be triggered by mandatory registration under the 1940 Act. This primary legislation would also impose standardized valuation mechanisms, corporate governance requirements, and
disclosure mandates, which still do not apply to Private Funds. Overall,
Congress did not retool the registration requirements provided under the
1940 Act as a mechanism for incorporating systemic risk measures or controls in the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.
The Dodd Frank Act did, however, create a new reporting obligation
for Private Funds, which also applies to mid-sized Private Funds that are
exempt from Advisers Act registration.219 Under this new requirement,
Private Fund advisers must file a confidential Form PF with the SEC,
which includes proprietary information such as use of leverage,
counterparty credit exposure, trading and investment positions, valuation
policies and practices, types of assets held, and “such other informaunder the 1940 Act. For the remainder of this article, Private Funds refer to investment
companies that are exempt under Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the 1940 Act.
215. §§ 407–410, 124 Stat. at 1574–76 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
216. § 408, 124 Stat. 1376, 1575 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1)). However, these funds are still required to maintain certain records and provide certain reports
as the SEC deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(2)). In addition, private funds with less than
$100 million in assets under management must register with applicable state authorities.
§ 410, 124 Stat. at 1577.
217. § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)).
218. §§ 409, 124 Stat. at 1575 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(G))
(family offices); 407, 124 Stat. at 1574 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l)(1))
(venture capital funds); 403, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b3(b)(3)) (foreign advisers).
219. § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(3)). Certain
mid-sized funds, presumably including certain funds that would be exempt pursuant to
Section 408 of the Act (which exempts advisers who have less than $150 million under
management), could be subject to these additional reporting requirements if they pose a
systemic risk to the economy. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(m)(1)).
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tion . . . the Commission . . . determines is necessary and appropriate [for
disclosure] in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for
the assessment of systemic risk[.] . . .”220 These confidential disclosures
are likely designed to assist the SEC in identifying the Private Funds that
pose a systemic risk to the economy.221 Investors will not have access to
this information because it has been deemed proprietary. Private Fund
interest groups successfully lobbied Congress to find that the public disclosure of information related to their underlying strategies would destroy the competitive nature of the industry and subsequently lead to
significant investor losses. The SEC is thus required to guarantee the confidentiality of these disclosures and can only reveal this information to
Congress or to other regulatory bodies, such as the newly created FSOC,
which is designed to oversee institutions that pose a systemic threat to the
economy.222
2. Retooling of Commodity Exchange Act
Under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress also created a new
regulatory framework for OTC derivatives.223 Since Private Funds frequently rely on OTC derivatives in pursuing innovative strategies, this
new framework has significantly altered the regulatory framework that
applies to these entities.224 The hallmark feature of Title VII requires that
many OTC derivative contracts be centrally cleared through authorized
clearinghouses.225 Such parties must become a member of an authorized
clearinghouse or contract with a member of an authorized clearinghouse
in order to trade OTC derivatives.226 Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, parties trading in OTC derivatives would instead enter into bilateral contracts to effectuate their trading relationships. These contracts were
privately negotiated and documented, making the full scope of the industry opaque from a regulatory perspective. Interposing a clearinghouse
into this trading relationship standardized the process of these trades, and
as illustrated by Professor Kristin Johnson, “[m]igrating the trades within
the industry onto a clearinghouse platform thus mitigates risk exposure
by increasing the transparency in the industry and maximizing alloca220. § 404, 124 Stat, at 1572 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(3)(H)).
221. See § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(1)(A)).
222. § 404, 124 Stat. at 1573 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § (b)(7)(B)).
223. §§ 701–74, 124 Stat. at 1641–1802 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
12, & 15 U.S.C.).
224. See id.
225. Id. While the Dodd-Frank Act granted the CFTC primary authority to regulate the
OTC derivative market, it granted the SEC exclusive authority to regulate “security-based
swaps,” which are “swaps based on a single security or loan or a narrow-based group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or the value thereof), or events relating
to a single issuer or issuers of securities in a narrow-based security index.” Derivatives, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml [https://
perma.cc/D4P6-84AW].
226. §§ 711–74, 124 Stat. at 1641–802 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
12, & 15 U.S.C.).
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tional efficiency.”227 This clearinghouse mandate also “requir[es] realtime trade reporting . . . [and] allow[s] the regulators to see the volume of
contracts trading in the market,” which allows regulators “to monitor derivatives trading data and . . . to oversee risk exposures and reduce systemic risk in the derivatives markets.”228
The Dodd-Frank Act gave authority to the CFTC to retool a number of
exemptions provided under the Commodity Exchange Act. Pursuant to
this authority, the CFTC eliminated CFTC Rule 4.13(a)(4), which previously exempted Private Funds that restricted investors to “qualified eligible purchasers.”229 As previously discussed, these investors encompass
several categories of high-net-worth individual and institutional investors,
including qualified purchasers as defined under the 1940 Act.230 In eliminating this exemption, many Private Funds would thus be required to register under the Commodity Exchange Act and comply with additional
layers of regulation, such as additional disclosure obligations, filing fees,
and recordkeeping requirements, among others. While some funds do in
fact have to register with the CFTC as a result of the repeal of 4.13(a)(4),
many instead rely on CFTC Rule 4.7, which provides such funds relief
from certain reporting and disclosure requirements mandated under the
Commodity Exchange Act.231 Private Funds can also rely on CFTC Rule
4.13(a)(3), which exempts funds that trade de minimis levels of futures.
3. FSOC and Possible SIFI Designations
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, FSOC “is charged with identifying risks to
the financial stability of the United States; promoting market discipline;
and responding to emerging risks to the stability of the United States’
financial system.”232 This newly created entity also has the power to designate both “bank entities” and “non-bank entities,” such as Private
Funds, for example, as “systemically important financial institutions”
(SIFIs). In determining whether non-bank entities should be categorized
as SIFIs, FSOC analyzes the following characteristics: “(i) [s]ize, (ii) interconnectedness, (iii) substitutability, (iv) leverage, (v) liquidity risk and
maturity mismatch, and (vi) existing regulatory scrutiny.”233 The FSOC
uses these characteristics to determine whether a non-bank entity is vulnerable to financial distress, and whether an entity’s financial distress
227. Kristin Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L.
REV. 185, 216 (2013).
228. Hedge Funds and Dodd-Frank Reform, MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, https://
www.managedfunds.org/issues-policy/issues/hedge-funds-and-dodd-frank-reform [https://
perma.cc/F7J7-2Q4T].
229. FOLEY HOAG LLP, supra note 175.
230. Id.
231. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.7(b) (2016).
232. Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/home.aspx [https://perma.cc/U6LM-NNRQ].
233. Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637–21,641 (Apr. 11, 2012) (amending 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
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would adversely impact the broader economy.234 Once a non-bank entity
is classified as a SIFI, it is then subject to enhanced regulation under the
Dodd-Frank Act that would be similar to the prudential regulation typically imposed upon banks.235 The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) would
then supervise and implement this enhanced regulation. Should a SIFI
fail, it would enter into a receivership process that would be administered
and supervised by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.236
FSOC has yet to designate a Private Fund as a SIFI, and the likelihood
of FSOC making this kind of designation has declined significantly in recent years.237 In 2012, FSOC called on the Treasury Department’s Office
of Financial Research (OFR) to investigate the extent to which Private
Funds create systemic risk.238 While the final report found that hedge
funds could in fact amplify and transmit systemic risk through possible
reliance on highly leveraged strategies,239 the industry has consistently
disagreed with these findings. In particular, the Managed Fund Association (MFA) has consistently argued that the existing regulation of its investment bank counterparties, as well as the new clearing requirements
for OTC derivatives, sufficiently deters excessive leverage.240 This opposition also found support from the SEC, as the agency has frequently
highlighted the distinct differences between Private Funds and investment banks, and has similarly queried whether the FRB has the expertise
to regulate the Private Fund industry sufficiently. As a result, FSOC has
recently announced that it will instead focus on systemic risk posed by the
products and activities of Private Funds, instead of focusing on the underlying entity as a whole.241
Even still, the SEC will likely assert a stronger stance as the primary
regulator over these emerging issues within the Private Fund industry. As
one commentator noted, “FSOC and other regulators now expect the
SEC to assume a prudential supervisory role, in addition to exercising its
traditional mandate of investor protection.”242 Moreover, international
administrators, such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Inter234. See id.
235. Andy Winkler, Primer: FSOC’s SIFI Designation Process for Nonbank Financial
Companies, AMERICAN ACTION FORUM (Sept. 3, 2014), http://americanactionforum.org/
research/primer-fsocs-sifi-designation-process-for-nonbank-financial-companies [https://
perma.cc/362S-6Q4J].
236. Id.
237. See id.
238. See ASSET MGMT. & FIN. STABILITY, OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH 1 (Sept. 2013),
http://financialresearch.gov/reports/files/ofr_asset_management_and_financial_stability.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SH79-TW5N].
239. See id. at 9.
240. See, e.g., MFA Comments on Significantly Systemic Institutions, MANAGED FUNDS
ASS’N (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/2.25.11MFA.letter.on_.systemically.significant.institutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/SXF4-8CS4].
241. Asset Managers: FSOC Stands Down, SEC Stands up, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 1–2 (Nov. 2014), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/
regulatory-services/publications/assets/fs-reg-brief-asset-managers-fsoc-stands-down-secstands-up-sifis.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ96-6TSS].
242. Id. at 1.
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national Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) have concluded that Private Funds could in fact enhance systemic risk irrespective
of the existing regulations over counterparties and OTC derivatives. On
March 4, 2015, the FSB and IOSCO published a consultation study (Consultation Study) that noted the following:
[I]t is still possible for an investment fund to become highly leveraged through derivatives that are not centrally-cleared, particularly if
margining practices for the non-centrally cleared derivatives are inadequate. Hence leverage constitutes a central component in the
analysis of the counterparty channel, particularly for those funds that
are not subject to any restrictions and may build up significant leverage positions (e.g. private funds).243
Both domestic and international regulators will likely continue this
contested process of measuring and identifying appropriate systemic risk
indicators within the investment company industry. As discussed in Part
V below, incorporating these final resolutions into the 1940 Act will help
to ensure continuity in documenting these evolving notions of publicness.
IV. RESULTING INCOHERENCY AND INVESTOR
PROTECTION HARMS
Through the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress has drastically
altered historic indicators of publicness in the investment company industry. Private Funds are now required to register under the Advisers Act
and are subject to increased oversight by the CFTC.244 OTC derivatives
must also be cleared through authorized clearinghouses with the hopes of
enhancing transparency in the previously opaque industry. Moreover, systemically relevant Private Funds could be subject to additional prudential
oversight by the SEC and FSOC, although the full extent of this oversight
is still unclear. In spite of these sweeping changes to the industry, the
1940 Act has remained largely untouched.
Since these evolving notions of publicness have been integrated into
the ancillary laws that regulate such vehicles, or addressed through additional layers of regulation, Congress has effectively expanded and complicated the patchwork of regulation that applies to these entities.
Extending this regulatory patchwork has further complicated the distinction between private and public investment companies. Defining the contours of publicness within the investment company industry is now an
arduous task that involves mapping out a long list of ancillary exemptions
and trying to predict the extent to which FSOC may deem a Private
Fund, or its underlying activities, systemically harmful. Thus, there is no
243. FIN. STABILITY BD. & INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER: ASMETHODOLOGIES FOR IDENTIFYING NON-BANK NON-INSURER GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 33 (Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter
CONSULTATION STUDY], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/2ndCon-Doc-on-NBNI-G-SIFI-methodologies.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DSU-JPCK].
244. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
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clear concept of publicness from a practical, theoretical, or regulatory
perspective. This Part describes two investor protection harms that have
likely resulted from this improper focus on ancillary legislation: (1)
under-inclusive indicators of publicness under the 1940 Act, which could
effectively exempt systemically relevant investment companies from effective regulation; and (2) over-inclusive indicators of publicness under
the 1940 Act, which could restrict retail investors from accessing innovative strategies during times of economic distress.
A. UNDER-INCLUSIVE INDICATORS

UNDER THE

1940 ACT

In spite of the extensive innovations that have occurred in the investment company industry, with respect to evolving notions of publicness
and Congress’s accompanying responses, the 1940 Act has remained
largely unaltered. The predominant indicator of publicness is still status of
investors as most Private Funds rely on Section 3(c)(7) in order to maintain exemptions under the 1940 Act. Other indicators such as number of
investors and advertising have been significantly narrowed under the recently passed JOBS Act. Private Funds can now maintain exemptions
under the Exchange Act with as many as 2,000 investors, and Private
Funds are now permitted to advertise to solicit a larger number of elite
investors.245 As such, Private Funds can simply restrict investments to
qualified purchasers to evade significant oversight. This reliance on status
of investors as the dividing line between public and private is possibly
under-inclusive, as it exempts all Private Funds from regulation under the
1940 Act, irrespective of whether such pools pose a systemic threat to the
economy.
Congress attempted to resolve this loophole by mandating registration
under the Advisers Act, retooling clearing requirements under the Commodity Exchange Act, and creating FSOC to regulate Private Funds that
could pose a systemic threat to the economy. But there are several limitations related to these mandates. With respect to Advisers Act registration, this requirement has enhanced transparency in the industry by
creating additional disclosure obligations for the underlying advisers of
such pools, as well as heightened fiduciary duties. However, this law is
limited in its oversight of systemic risk, as it has no required capital restrictions, valuation mechanisms, or governance requirements related to
Private Fund entities. With respect to the new clearing requirements for
OTC derivatives, it has similarly enhanced transparency within these
markets. Yet, mandating clearing could serve to transfer and concentrate
systemic risk within clearinghouse entities. Professor Kristin Johnson specifically noted that, “[i]f a clearinghouse member with a large volume of
contracts or a series of members whose transaction constitutes a significant volume of contracts should default, the clearinghouse may face insol245. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfjjobsactfaq-title-i-general
.htm [https://perma.cc/8ZF3-KKTY].
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vency or bankruptcy.”246 With respect to the power granted to FSOC, the
council has yet to develop sufficient systemic risk indicators for the industry. FSOC’s efforts to produce systemic risk indicators have been widely
criticized by the private sector, as well as by the SEC. As a result, the
likelihood of FSOC designating a Private Fund as a SIFI has significantly
declined. Overall, the obligation to comply with this extended patchwork
of regulation has significantly increased compliance costs, without necessarily producing the intended benefits of mitigating systemic risk. These
costs inevitably get passed down to the underlying investors, which could
further compromise investor protection.
This potential loophole with respect to systemic risk is somewhat
troubling given that the Private Fund industry will likely expand in coming years. Institutional investors such as pension plans, endowments, and
insurance companies are increasingly investing in Private Funds, which
can expose their retail investor constituents to significant losses. Some
pension plans, such as CAPLERS, have admittedly divested their hedge
fund allocations due to concerns related to excessive complexity and inability to beat the markets.247 Yet, many pension plans are facing significant challenges that have driven the desire to allocate to innovative
strategies. As one commentator noted, “[l]ife for pension funds is getting
tough. The race to the bottom in global interest rates has reduced the rate
at which funds discount their future liabilities. Life expectancy continues
to surge. Deficits have ballooned.”248 A 2015 study administered by J.P.
Morgan found that 94% of such investors plan to maintain or increase
hedge fund investments in the coming years.249 In 2014 for example, the
Texas County & District Retirement System allocated 25% of its assets
into hedge funds.250 In terms of private-sector pension plans, “[l]arge corporate pension funds have quadrupled the share of their portfolios invested in hedge funds over the past five years, according to an analysis of
about 300 firms in the S&P 500 by Wilshire Consulting.”251
One can certainly argue that institutional investors can sufficiently protect themselves against the risks discussed herein.252 Institutional inves246. Johnson, supra note 227, at 226.
247. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY, supra note 15.
248. Christopher Swann, Why Hedge Funds Still Make Sense for Pension Funds, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/business/dealbook/why-hedgefunds-still-make-sense-for-pension-funds.html [https://perma.cc/S4R8-WP4H].
249. Capital Introduction Group Institutional Investor Survey, supra note 185, at 60.
250. Williamson, supra note 21.
251. Timothy W. Martin, Hedge-Fund Bet Hits Pensions Firms moved portfolios away
from stock market to reduce risk, but missed out on rally, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2015), http:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-bet-hits-pensions-1434496049 [https://perma.cc/JK54HLRW].
252. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 992 (2006) (“[Hedge
fund] [i]nvestors, particularly institutional investors, engage in active due diligence before
investing, routinely retain advisory firms to evaluate options for them, and negotiate for
more disclosure from hedge funds.”); Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 713–14 (2000) (arguing that existing anti-fraud protections
sufficiently protect hedge fund investors).
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tors typically invest significant resources in undergoing due diligence and
research with respect to prospective Private Fund investments.253 Nevertheless, there have been occurrences where the inadvertent mistakes of
such investors have adversely impacted their retail investor constituents.
For instance, when a prominent hedge fund, Amaranth Advisors, L.P.,
lost close to $6 billion due to unanticipated fluctuations in natural gas
prices, the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association lost its
approximately $87 million investment in this fund.254 Moreover, a systemic risk calamity is typically triggered by a completely random event
that may have pervaded the complex calculations implemented by fund
managers. And given the numerous reports that hedge funds cannot beat
the markets,255 Private Fund advisers may start pursuing more aggressive
strategies that entail higher degrees of risk. To the extent that either
FSOC or the SEC identifies a fund as being a systemic threat, that fund
should also be subject to tailored regulation under the 1940 Act. Investors of such funds, as well as possible retail constituents, should be entitled to protections against any resulting losses. The 1940 Act could
effectively provide enhanced transparency with respect to such funds,
mandate standardized valuation mechanisms for exotic instruments, and
implement corporate governance mechanisms to closely monitor the underlying strategies of such advisers.
B. OVER-INCLUSIVE INDICATORS

UNDER THE

1940 ACT

The reliance on status of investors as the predominant indicator of publicness under the 1940 Act is also over-inclusive from an investor protection standpoint. It does not permit regulators to make the nuanced
distinctions necessary to address the heterogeneous fund industry. While
some Private Funds are not appropriate for investment by retail investors
for the reasons discussed in Part IV.A above, others may rely on innovative strategies that could create unique diversification and profit-maximizing opportunities for retail investors without exposing those investors
to excessive risks. Since RICs are automatically subject to the stringent
capital restrictions under the 1940 Act, they are restricted from accessing
innovative products such as derivatives, illiquid instruments, distressed
securities, and other exotic instruments. Mutual funds and other RICs
primarily rely on equities, bonds, and cash instruments in order to earn
returns for investors.
In contrast, Private Funds have unfettered access to a plethora of exotic instruments, illiquid investments, and non-U.S. investment opportunities to assist in maximizing investor returns. Because of these
flexibilities, hedge funds are often viewed as the leaders in extracting the
benefits of financial innovation, as they attract the best managerial talent
253. Gibson, supra note 252, at 713.
254. Jonathan H. Bliley, Shutting the Door on Pension Fund Investment in Hedge Funds
- Protecting Investors That Need Protection, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 455, 456 (2008).
255. LACK, supra note 18.
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to take advantage of these broad liberties. They are characterized as having the ability to earn “absolute returns,” which means that they seek to
guarantee returns irrespective of market performance.256 Strategies include market neutral, global macro, opportunistic, emerging markets, and
distressed securities, to name a few.257 With respect to private equity and
venture capital funds, these vehicles typically invest in an assortment of
private companies and investments. These can include start-ups, leveraged buy-outs, mezzanine financing, and distressed companies, among
others.258 Because private fund advisers are not obliged to fulfill daily
redemption requests and can even suspend redemptions at their election,
they can invest in instruments that are highly illiquid, as investor subscriptions can be locked into private vehicles for an extended period of
time.259
This inequitable access is more likely to have an adverse impact on
retail investors during times of economic distress, where “the prices of
securities are falling, and widespread pessimism causes the negative sentiment to be self-sustaining.”260 During these time periods, hedge funds
can often rely on their increased freedoms to engage in short-trading and
other innovative strategies to protect investors from these declining
prices.261 On the whole, the hedge fund industry outperformed the mutual fund industry during the Great Recession.262 More specifically, in
2008, the value of global equities collectively fell forty-two percent while
hedge funds worldwide lost a comparatively smaller 19 percent for their
investors.263 Commentators have recently noted that hedge funds have
been underperforming the markets in recent years.264 However, this
trend could possibly reverse when our economy enters into a bear market, which appears inevitable given the natural flow of the business cycle.
As retail investors are often the most vulnerable class of investors during
times of economic distress, resulting in dwindling retirement and savings
accounts, an increasing retirement age, and decreasing property values,
the potential disparities created by this divide have become more problematic and difficult to justify.

256. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 170, at 33.
257. Dion Friedland, Synopsis of Hedge Fund Strategies, MAGNUM FUNDS, http://
www.magnum.com/hedgefunds/strategies.asp [https://perma.cc/5RG3-BSA3].
258. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 13.1 (2015).
259. Id. § 4.19.
260. Bear Market, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bearmarket.
asp [https://perma.cc/BE8J-5CGP].
261. See Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 244 (2009) (arguing generally
that hedge fund flexibilities allow such advisers to consistently outperform the broader
markets).
262. See id. at 243–44.
263. Id.
264. LACK, supra note 18.
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V. ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK: RECALIBRATE THE 1940
ACT
Congress’s attempt to incorporate emerging notions of publicness
under the ancillary laws discussed herein has served to complicate the
already extensive patchwork of regulation that applies to investment
companies. This extended patchwork has done little to resolve the systemic risk concerns expressed by Congress and has likely enhanced the
investor protection harms discussed in Part IV above. This Part thus proposes an alternative framework that would require the following actions:
(1) integrate emerging indicators of publicness under the 1940 Act; (2)
conduct a wholesale review of 1940 Act; and (3) monitor other strategies
that could invoke public concerns such as hedge fund activism, thirdparty litigation funding, and investment in distressed economies such as
Detroit, Puerto Rico, and Greece. On the whole, recalibrating the 1940
Act to account for these emerging notions of publicness could help regulators resolve the over-inclusive and under-inclusive effects resulting
from the archaic reliance on status of investors.
A. INTEGRATION

AND

WHOLESALE REVIEW

Congress has effectively identified systemic risk as being the preeminent concern in regulating evolving notions of publicness in the investment company industry. As such, this section focuses on systemic risk as
the emerging indicator that should be incorporated under the 1940 Act.
In order to effectuate this goal, regulators must first agree on specific
indicators and measures for systemic risk. This will continue to be a difficult endeavor given the recent challenges faced by FSOC in addressing
this issue. Determining ideal indicators is largely outside the scope of this
article as this will entail further study and analysis by a range of experts.
Even still, a suggested starting point could be the Consultation Study
published by the FSB and IOSCO on March 4, 2015. This Consultation
Study was sanctioned by G20 leaders during the Cannes Summit in November 2011, and provides suggested indicators of systemic risk for investment company structures, coupled with possible measures.265
Potential indicators for determining whether investment companies
create or transmit systemic risk include the following characteristics: size,
interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity, and global activities.266
With respect to size, the Consultation Study noted that, “[t]he importance
of a single entity for the stability of the financial system generally increases with the scale of financial activity that the entity undertakes”; suggested measures include net assets under management and gross national
exposure.267 In terms of interconnectedness, systemic risk is likely heightened when the activities of investment companies are inextricably linked
265. CONSULTATION STUDY, supra note 243, at 1.
266. Id. at 6.
267. Id. at 6, 38.
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with various counterparties. Hence, the failure of a particular fund could
have a ripple effect on the performance of its investment bank
counterparties. Suggested measures include balance sheet financial leverage, as well as the ratio of collateral posted by a fund relative to its
NAV.268
Substitutability relates to the ease through which other financial entities can provide comparable products in the event of a fund’s failure. This
indicator captures funds whose failure would decimate niche markets.269
A possible measure would compare a fund’s daily trading volume of a
particular asset, to the overall trading volume in the markets. In terms of
complexity, “the more complex a financial entity, the more difficult,
costly and time-consuming it will be to resolve the failing institution.”270
Complexity can be measured by a number of factors, including volume of
non-centrally cleared derivatives, liquidity profile, and reliance on algorithmic trading strategies.271 Lastly, “[t]he greater the global reach of a
financial entity, the more widespread the spill-over effects from its failure.”272 Examining the number of jurisdictions in which a fund invests,
sells its interests, or has counterparties can provide appropriate measures
for global activities.273
Since indicators of publicness are embedded in the exemptions and exclusions of federal securities laws, systemic risk indicators should similarly be integrated under 1940 Act exemptions. With Section 3(c)(7)
being the most popular amongst Private Funds, Congress could rely on
this exemption as a starting point for accommodating these changes. The
primary constraint under Section 3(c)(7) entails restricting investors to
qualified purchasers. To the extent regulators agree on appropriate systemic risk measures, they can then add such additional restrictions to this
provision. A basic example related to interconnectedness could read as
follows: “Private Funds relying on Section 3(c)(7) shall have a ratio of
collateral posted relative to its NAV that does not exceed x%.” An alternative approach would be to develop varying degrees of publicness similar
to Regulation D under the Securities Act. Regulators would effectively
develop a series of exemptions, incorporating multiple indicators of publicness, which would give regulators more flexibility to tailor varying degrees of restrictions. This approach may be better suited to accommodate
the heterogeneous nature of the fund industry.
Creating new exemptions in this manner would necessitate a wholesale
review of the 1940 Act. Many aspects of this law unduly restrict capital
formation and are not closely tailored to the innovative products offered
by Private Funds. For instance, the valuation mechanisms provided under
the 1940 Act may be wholly inadequate for valuing certain complex de268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 6, 40.
at 6.
at 42–43.
at 6.
at 44–45.
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rivatives. Regulators would have to consider developing standardized valuation mechanisms for these instruments, which could further enhance
investor protection in these niche markets. Other restrictions related to
conflict of interest transactions, as well as mandated daily redemptions,
would not match the practicalities of the Private Fund industry. Furthermore, many of the provisions under the 1940 Act are simply archaic and
would likely need to be updated to address the inequities between retail
and elite investors discussed in Part IV.B above. The stringent capital
restrictions provided under Section 18 of the 1940 Act have made it difficult for mutual funds and other RICs to pursue innovative strategies that
could protect investors in declining markets. Former SEC Commissioner
Professor Roberta S. Karmel has similarly suggested that the SEC undertake wholesale review of the 1940 Act to accommodate innovations in the
investment company industry. She specifically stated that, “[i]nstead of
trying to reform the [1940 Act] . . . to accommodate hedge funds and
private equity funds, the SEC exempted them for many years[.] . . .”274
By and large, reconciling publicness under the 1940 Act would provide
more clarity as to the distinction between private and public funds. It
would ensure that funds that do in fact invoke these emerging notions of
publicness are sufficiently regulated, thereby enhancing protection for
such underlying investors. Focusing on the 1940 Act would also reconcile
over-inclusive indicators that possibly exclude average investors from accessing strategies that could protect them in declining markets. This alternative framework is consistent with the SEC’s expressed desire to take
greater responsibility over the regulation of Private Funds. Given the recent failures of FSOC in undertaking this task, this alternative framework
provides a useful starting point for the SEC to carry out the Congressional mandates expressed under the Dodd-Frank Act.
B. MONITOR OTHER POSSIBLE INDICATORS

OF

PUBLICNESS

Systemic risk has been flagged by regulators as the preeminent focus in
regulating evolving notions of publicness. This focus largely derives from
the Great Recession, where the failure of large investment banks had a
ripple effect across the global economy. However, other innovations
within the fund industry that fall outside the purview of systemic risk
could also have a latent impact on the general public. Fund investments
have grown increasingly creative, particularly since the industry has
grown highly saturated in recent years. Advisers are constantly exploring
innovative mechanisms for earning returns and protecting their portfolios
against risk. Specific strategies that warrant further investigation entail
hedge fund activism, third-party litigation funding, and investment in distressed economies.
Hedge fund activists, for example, typically invest in public companies
that they deem undervalued. These activists purchase large stakes in
274. Karmel, supra note 78, at 700.
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these companies so that they can perhaps correct perceived mismanagements to improve each company’s value and thereby enhance their underlying investments.275 Initiatives at eBay, Family Dollar, and PepsiCo
provide popular examples of such activist campaigns.276 Determining
whether these strategies are actually good for public companies is subject
to much debate. On the one hand, supporters have applauded hedge fund
activists who utilize their role as large institutional shareholders to implement much needed changes that corporate boards have been unwilling to
implement for a variety of reasons. Many reports have recently established that hedge fund activists do in fact collectively add value to companies, and that the market responds quite well to the participation of
hedge funds in corporate governance.277 Conversely, critics have accused
hedge fund activists of “destroy[ing] companies by pushing them to load
up with debt, lay off employees, slash research and development, and
pump up short-term dividends and profits.”278 And any such failure
would adversely affect the value of the underlying shareholders of such
companies, many of which include retail investors. This article does not
attempt to resolve this ongoing debate. It does, however, flag this strategy
as one that could invoke heightened public concerns, particularly since
hedge funds currently besiege public companies on a daily basis.279
Third-party litigation funding is an industry “composed of institutional
investors who invest in litigation by providing finance in return for an
ownership stake in a legal claim and a contingency in the recovery.”280
Hedge funds have been increasingly employing this investment strategy,
particularly with respect to commercial litigation. Critics have alleged
that this strategy could compromise attorney-client privilege and perhaps
“encourage frivolous lawsuits while discouraging settlement.”281 In contrast, it can serve as a mechanism to connect legal services to individuals
who may not otherwise have the means to secure legal representation.282
In addition to these policy debates, many researchers are also concerned
that the growth of this industry could encourage the securitization of lawsuits where advisers simply repackage their litigation finance contracts
275. Bill George & Jay W. Lorsch, How to Outsmart Activist Investors HARV. BUS.
REV. (May 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/05/how-to-outsmart-activist-investors [https://
perma.cc/75NX-PMY9].
276. Frank Partnoy, The Surprising Market Response to Activist Hedge Funds, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-surprising-market-response-to-activist-hedge-funds-1429743683 [https://perma.cc/623K-DLDS].
277. See, e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS
FIN. 3–5 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551953 [https://perma.cc/NEM9-BRTW]
(“[E]vidence generally supports the view that hedge fund activism creates value for shareholders by effectively influencing the governance, capital structure decisions, and operating
performance of target firms.”).
278. Partnoy, supra note 276.
279. See id.
280. Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third-Party Funding Litigation, http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=1586053 (Aug. 2, 2010) (full article at 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011)).
281. Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Revolution
58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 576 (2010).
282. Id.
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into financial products that can be resold to a larger number of investors.
Repackaging contracts in this manner would likely transform these instruments into asset-backed securities, triggering regulation under the
Dodd-Frank Act. Professor Victoria Shannon Sahani has further suggested that the underlying litigation funding contract be subject to regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act or other securities laws, given the latent
risks associated with securitization.283 She has similarly noted that these
underlying contracts are subject to minimal regulation and has suggested
a number of regulatory reforms in a series of articles.284 Given the potential effect that such contracts can have on the general public, either
through securitization or other policy concerns expressed herein, regulators should at least begin the process of compiling a regulatory framework in the coming years.
Hedge funds are also frequent purchasers of debt issued by distressed
economies, such as Detroit, Puerto Rico, and Greece.285 The participation of hedge funds in these debt markets has engendered a spectrum of
debates, the resolution of which is largely outside the scope of this article.
However, the common thread revealed by these debates is that these private entities now have a direct impact over public policies produced by
these governments. In some cases, this impact yields positive results, as
hedge funds can infuse much-needed capital into cash-strapped governments that are facing dire budget deficits, thereby reducing the likelihood
of bankruptcy.286 In other cases, this impact can yield negative results,
such as mandating stringent repayment measures that force governments
to encourage austerity measures that disproportionately affect marginalized populations.287 For example, municipal debtholders in Puerto Rico
administered an economic report that advocated cuts to public education
283. Victoria Shannon Sahani, Third-Party Litigation Funding and the Dodd-Frank Act,
16 TENN. J. BUS. L. 15, 19 (2014).
284. Victoria Shannon Sahani, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regulation,
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 861–62 (2015) (“This Article proposes harmonizing the regulatory framework for third-party litigation funding in the United States by identifying the
three categories of interactions—transactional, procedural, and ethical—that make up
third-party litigation funding, and suggesting avenues for regulation within those three categories.”); Victoria Shannon Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 388,
391 (2016) (The Article “provid[es] guidance to federal judges on how to interpret the
existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address third-party funding . . . and suggests
rule revisions to the Advisory Committee for future consideration.”).
285. Tom Hals, Detroit Draws Attention from Hedge Fund Investors Looking to Profit
Off City’s Debt, Possible Bankruptcy, REUTERS (May 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/05/08/detroit-investors-hedge-funds-bankruptcy-debt_n_3234577.html [https://
perma.cc/5K2F-ZHCG]; Matt Wirz, Big Hedge Funds Roll Dice on Puerto Rico Debt,
WALL ST. J. (April 9, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230387360457
9491992862363698 [https://perma.cc/H96H-G6Z7]; Michelle Celarier, Hedge Funds Show
Little Fear Buying Greek Debt, N.Y. POST (July 6, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/07/06/
hedge-funds-show-little-fear-buying-greek-debt [https://perma.cc/C2P5-KP9D].
286. Tim Fernholz, How Hedge Funds Can Help Detroit Avoid Bankruptcy, QUARTZ
(June 14, 2013), http://qz.com/94613/how-hedge-funds-can-help-detroit-avoid-bankruptcy
[https://perma.cc/MRG8-UDBR].
287. See Hedge funds Want Puerto Rico to Close Schools, CNNMONEY (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/04/investing/puerto-rico-hedge-funds-close-schools/ [https://
perma.cc/6SGW-YXXL].
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and enhanced mechanisms for collecting taxes.288 Protestors have even
accused hedge fund investors of “going after schools, cutting teachers and
other kinds of austerity measures in their voracious, rapacious desire to
recoup all profits at any cost[.] . . .”289 Hedge fund lobbyists could likewise be incentivized to push for self-serving legislation, such as favorable
tax treatment, perhaps at the expense of their government counterparties,
who represent the general public. Given the potential for hedge funds to
influence the public policies effectuated by governments, regulators
should investigate the extent to which these scenarios warrant additional
oversight.
VI. CONCLUSION
The investment company industry has rapidly evolved since the passage
of the federal securities laws. Regulators have made crucial efforts to accommodate these innovations in the face of budget constraints, intense
public scrutiny, and political roadblocks such as jurisdictional battles
amongst agencies and bureaucratic inefficiencies. In reconciling these
challenges, regulators must often produce responsive regulation within a
very short time frame and are severely limited in taking action proactively to resolve ineffective regulations. These challenges have likely contributed to the growing complexities of the regulatory framework that
applies to investment company structures. For instance, Congress hurriedly passed the Dodd-Frank Act in response to a monumental financial
crisis that crippled the global economy. The time constraint likely influenced Congress’s decision, at least from a political perspective, to focus
simply on using ancillary laws to regulate Private Funds in light of evolving notions of publicness. Revamping the primary legislation provided
under the 1940 Act would have required significantly more resources,
which might not have been readily available during the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act.
Nevertheless, reconciling publicness under the 1940 Act would provide
a clearer distinction between private and public funds. It would also ensure that emerging notions of publicness, such as systemic risk, are sufficiently regulated under the federal securities laws. In a similar vein,
focusing on the 1940 Act would help to reconcile the over-inclusive indicators that have excluded average investors from accessing strategies
that could protect them in declining markets. This arduous task of revamping the 1940 Act will likely become necessary given the industry’s
penchant for never-ending innovation. Strategies such as hedge fund activism, third-party litigation funding, and distressed municipal debt have
similarly placed stress on the public-private divide. Regulators should
288. Jessica Dinapoli, Protestors Target Hedge Fund Holding Puerto Rico Debt,
REUTERS (July 30, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/30/usa-puertorico-protestidUSL1N10A2JH20150730 [https://perma.cc/6AYN-LSSH].
289. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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constantly monitor emerging notions of publicness, as advisers will continuously explore creative mechanisms for beating the markets.

452

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

